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Abstract

THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE AND THE MAKING OF A MODERN PUBLIC: POLICING,
POLITICS, AND PARADES IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY HAMBURG, 1806-1830
By Brendan William Haidinger, Master of Arts
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts at
Virginia Commonwealth University
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2013.
Director: Dr. George Munro
Professor, Department of History
Despite the attention historians have given to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras in
Central Europe, few works have sought to understand these events' reverberations throughout the
nineteenth century in a local or regional context. Taking the northern German city of Hamburg
as its focal point, this study investigates the change in the urban political culture affected by
eight years of Napoleonic occupation. In the process of replacing Hamburg's sprawling and
archaic government with one characterized by Gallic centralization and rigor, the French
introduced a new style of politics that relied on consistent, public, and martial presentations of its
authority. This public presence was heightened not only by the implementation of modern
policing techniques, but also by a series of choreographed, ideologically-charged public
spectacles whose effectiveness relied on a clever manipulation and politicization of urban space.

INTRODUCTION

For several generations of historians, the Napoleonic Wars marked the origins of German
nationalism while also sparking the process of political and economic modernization throughout
Central Europe. During the nineteenth century, the period was integrated into a heroicnationalist and Prusso-centric master narrative, as both historians and contemporaries regarded
the wars of 1806 to 1815 as the direct precursors to the wars of 1864 to 1871 and the emergence
of the German Kaiserreich. Scholarship of the post-World War II generation often marginalized
or ignored experiences of other German states, incorporating them into a Prussian historical
framework. No historian has framed the argument quite as provocatively as Thomas Nipperday,
who introduced his study of nineteenth-century Germany with the infamous maxim: “In the
beginning was Napoleon.”1 Yet it would not be until the 1990s that historians shifted their focus
to the regional level, complicating our view of German Central Europe prior to unification.2
While this study of the north German city-state of Hamburg is fundamentally indebted to such
research, it takes a somewhat different tack as it is not necessarily concerned with the emergence

1

Thomas Nipperday, Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck, 1800-1866, trans. by Daniel Nolan (Princeton,
1966), 1. As Stephan Berger has argued, nineteenth-century historians, appointing themselves as nation-builders,
created a “backwards-oriented teleological myth of the nation,” The Search for Normality: National Identity and
Historical Consciousness in Germany Since 1800 (Providence, RI., 1997), 1-25.
2

Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German idea of Heimat (Berkeley, 1990); Alon Confino,
The Nation as Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany and National Memory, 1871-1918 (Chapel Hill,
NC., 1997); Abigail Green, Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford,
2001); James Retallack, “Introduction: Locating Saxony in the Landscape of German Regional History” in Saxony
in German History: Culture Society and Politics, 1830-1933, ed. by idem (Ann Arbor, 2000), 2, 7-8.
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of German nationalism or state building. Rather than documenting the complex process of
fashioning national unity from former independent polities, the focus here is on the formation of
a distinct political culture that directed Hamburg’s development throughout the first half of the
nineteenth century.
The decades under consideration are part of what has been identified as a “Sattelzeit,” the
period between 1750 and the late 1840s that bridged the early modern and modern periods in
Central Europe. Over the course of the last twenty years, historians have argued that this era
evidences important social, economic, political, and gender transformations that helped shape the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries in Germany in ways historians had yet to fully
understand.3 More specifically, this study explores the influence the French Revolution, the
Napoleonic wars, and eight years of Imperial occupation had on the social and political life of
the Hanseatic city-state of Hamburg. This work joins similar studies on the Rhineland,
Württemberg, and Prussia that seek to uncover how contemporaries experienced an era of
unprecedented upheaval and uncertainty.4 Occupation and war are front and center here as I
argue that the period between 1792 and 1815 was transformative for both the practice of

3

According to scholars associated with the history of concepts (Begriffsgeschichte), the Sattelzeit is a
watershed where in which traditional authority “unevenly crumbled” under the weight of new practices, mentalities,
and ideas. See Reinhart Koselleck, Future Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. by Keith Tribe
(Cambridge, MA., 1985).
4

Michael Rowe, From Reich to State: The Rhineland in the Revolutionary Age, 1780-1830 (Cambridge,
2003); idem, ed., Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe: State Formation in the Age of Upheaval,
1800-1815 (New York, 2003); Ian McNeely, The Emancipation of Writing: German Civil Society in the Making,
1790s-1820s (Berkeley, 2003). See the articles in Alan Forest, Karen Hagemann, and Jane Rendall, eds., Soldiers,
Citizens, and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the French Wars 1790-1820 (London, 2009); Alan Forest
and Phillip Dwyer, eds., Napoleon and His Empire: Europe, 1804-1814 (London, 2007); Alan Forest and Peter H.
Wilson, eds., The Bee and the Eagle: Napoleonic France and the End of the Holy Roman Empire (War, Culture, and
Society, 1750-1850) (London, 2009).

2

Fig. 1. Map of Hamburg, 1813-1814. Including a view of Hamburg-Harburg Bridge.

3

politics and the way in which contemporary Hamburgers related to their community.5 This study
also takes as its guiding premise that eight years of Imperial occupation fundamentally reordered
the ways in which authority in Hamburg was understood, legitimized, and practiced. The
methods by which post-Napoleonic regimes (such as Hamburg’s post-1814 Senate) asserted,
articulated, and defended themselves and the socio-economic and legal order they represented,
are crucial concepts for understanding the dynamics of modern politics.
Underlying much of this study are questions regarding the nature and applicability of the
term “modernization.” The historiography concerning the process in German history is
understandably massive and far too overwhelming for any single scholar to master. In general,
the majority of the work on modernization has focused almost exclusively on the twin projects of
state building and the transition to democracy.6 Less attention has been paid to other trends
considered fundamental to the emergence of modern political institutions and which have roots
in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This exploration of how the French Imperial
administration in Hamburg organized and practiced its authority, and how Hamburg’s postoccupation Senate reestablished its legitimacy after 1814, exposes both the state’s
monopolization and use of coercive measures and the process by which urban space became
fully politicized. Each regime relied heavily on a professionalized policing agency, increasingly
responsive to state demand, to replace traditional and communal practices of law enforcement
and social control. Likewise, both the French administration and the post-war Senate in
Hamburg staged highly-choreographed and ideologically-charged public displays that relied on
5

Katherine Aaslestad, Place and Politics: Local Identity, Civic Culture, and German Nationalism in North
Germany during the Revolutionary Era (Boston, 2005), 1-32.
6

Margaret L. Anderson, Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany
(Princeton, 2000), 3-21. See also Larry E. Jones and James Retallack’s “Introduction: Political Mobiliztion and
Collective Identities in Modern German History,” in Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern
Germany: New Perspectives, ed. Hartmut Lehmann (Cambridge, 1992), 1-16.
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the clever manipulation of urban space. These phenomena are directly related to the slow and
often indirect processes of increased state centralization, the emergence of a “public sphere,” and
new ideas emanating out of the French Revolution, and have histories that would unfold
throughout the revolutionary nineteenth century, and became central features of modern political
cultures of the West.
The first of such themes under investigation is the state’s monopolization of coercive
force in both occupied (chapter one) and post-occupied Hamburg (chapter two). The concept
itself was not new to the nineteenth century as it had its intellectual roots in the late-seventeenth
century. Fleeing the English Civil Wars only to end up in France during the wars known
collectively as the Fronde, Thomas Hobbes wrote Leviathan to offer resolution for both
conflicts.7 Hobbes’ reply to civil war and the confusion it engendered was, of course, the
coercive power of a sovereign; conceived in either an individual or an assembly, the sovereign
was to be considered indivisible, relatively autonomous, and necessary for the conversion of a
mass of individuals into a well-structured society.8 Contrasting with Machiavelli, Hobbes argued
that the sovereign’s legitimacy was earned from subjects by the quelling of civil strife and the
assuring of stability. Ending the “war of all against all” induces “awe” in the people, Hobbes
asserted, and as the sovereign’s rules continue to make life more predictable, the people, who
stand to gain their individual rights, concede to the social contract.9
In reality, however, early modern practice of “repression” (as that which preserves the
social order) relied on cooperation amongst social groups (such as urban elites, rural nobles, and
7

Yves-Marie Bercé, History of Peasant Revolts: The Social Origins of Rebellion in Early Modern France,
trans. by Amanda Whitmore (Ithaca, 1990).
8

Richard Tuck, ed., Leviathan, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1996), x-xii.

9

Carl Schmitt considered Hobbes the theoretical father of a liberal state; see, Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan
in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol, trans. by George Schwab
(Westport, CT., 1996); James B. Rule, Theories of Civil Violence (Berkeley, 1988), 18-26.
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the local population) as well as a more democratized access to the means of coercion. The term
“policing” in Hamburg had, up until the city’s first year of occupation, maintained a connotation
of moral improvement and social caretaking. As historian Howard Brown has argued for the
case of Napoleonic France, the shift from traditional notions of communal justice and
democratized access to coercion towards the state’s monopolization of coercive means was
completed between 1797 and 1802, when state-appointed magistrates and military commissions
intervened throughout France to restore order during a period of intense lawlessness.10 Brown’s
theoretical considerations, as well as my own, rely heavily on the work of prolific social
historian Charles Tilly. Tilly documented the long and bloody struggle by state-buildiers to
wrest coercive measures from other individuals and groups within their territories. Before the
eighteenth century, he argues, states did not monopolize force even within their own territories.
Urban militias, private armies, armies of regional lords and rival claimants to royal power, police
forces, and state armies all made some claim to the right to utilize coercive means. In this sense,
authority and control over internal coercion was “dispersed, overlapping, and democratized.”11
The process by which control over such means was monopolized and “made hierarchical”
entailed the state’s ability to impose itself as the “defender” of a distinct legal order. As historian
Janice Thompson argues, social groups “vigorously resisted” state-builders’ push to monopolize
both “political authority and the coercion on which it ultimately rested.”12 This process entailed
bargains being struck between state rulers and social groups in which the latter traded “warmaking resources” in an exchange for property and political rights. These bargains, Tilly argues,
10

Howard G. Brown, “Domestic State Violence: Repression from the Croquants to the Commune,” The
Historical Journal Vol. 42 (Sept., 1999): 597-622, here 622.
11

Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D. 990-1990. (Cambridge, 1990), 17-28.

12

Janice E. Thompson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence
in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, 1994), 3.
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are the “sub-plots” in an ongoing “drama” in which states centralized authority and the use of
coercion.13 While this historical trend did not necessarily require any protracted struggle
between competing interests in Hamburg per se, the process of state monopolization of force was
a product of a costly occupation.
A discussion regarding the state’s monopolization of force requires some conceptual
clarification, especially regarding the use of terms such as “force” and “violence.” Hobbes’
Leviathan has a certain affinity with Max Weber’s formulation of the state as “that agency in
society which has a monopoly of legitimate force.” Yet Weber never attempted to answer
questions regarding what makes force legitimate and violence illegitimate. In addition, Weber
neither investigated the practice of repression nor attempted to explain how a show of force
could enhance state authority and, in effect, increase the state’s legitimacy.14 Where most
scholars break with Hobbes is not with the idea that force is necessary to preserve the social
order, but that a sovereign should have unrestricted use of force. If methods of repression the
state employs appear excessive, then it becomes discredited as coercion, or what historian
Howard G. Brown has called, “domestic state violence.” The difference between legitimate use
of force and domestic state violence, he argues, is one easily missed. Violence and the legitimate
use of force are not interchangeable concepts; they are, in fact, “intrinsically opposites” even
though they may appear “extrinsically indistinguishable.” 15 Despite appearances then, the
difference between force and violence is not like beauty, in the eye of the beholder, nor is it a
matter of semantics. Thus Hannah Arendt’s claim that “violence can be justifiable, but it never

13

Tilly, Coercion, 72.

14

Howard G. Brown, Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice, and Repression from the Terror to
Napoleon (Charlottesville, VA., 2006).
15

Brown, Ending the French Revolution, 9.

7

will be legitimate,” is crucial here as it captures a most salient aspect of violence: it is a quasimoral concept linked to ascertaining means in terms of ends.16 In that respect, to describe force
as violence is to question an act’s legitimacy in terms of harmony and order. Because difference
of opinion regarding the “justness” of a particular social order compared to potential alternatives
becomes the basis for assessing the use of coercion, it is necessary for historians to distinguish
between legitimate force and violence. This distinction should not be made on the “morally
subjective” terrain of assessing ends and means.
Italian legal philosopher Sergio Cotta, who wrote in response to the Red Brigade of the
1970s, developed a theory that distinguishes between “force,” on the one hand, and “violence”
on the other, based solely on their “structural characteristics.”17 Both, he argues, have a physical
dimension and “disturb existing relationships,” but violence is distinguished from other forms of
coercion by being “sudden, unpredictable, discontinuous, and disproportionate.” Here, nature
offers a perfect example: a lengthy drought will damage crops more than a single storm, but only
the storm is perceived of as being violent. In “human affairs,” an act of force does not slip into
the realm of violence as long as it displays “measure” along three “axes”: internal, external, and
purposive.18 Internal measure means applying force with regularity and precision to increase
effectiveness and “decrease collateral damage.” External measure means using force in
“accordance with broadly accepted social, moral, and legal norms.” Purposive measure means
using force to “defend or establish” a distinct “form of polity.” Cotta argues that an act of force
may adhere to one or even two of these measures and yet still be violent: only the presence of all

16

Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York, 1970), 52; Brown, Ending the French Revolution, 10.

17

Sergio Cotta, Why Violence? A Philosophical Interpretation, trans. by Giovanni Gullace (Gainesville,

FL, 1985).
18

Cotta, Why Violence?, 68-71.
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three measures prevents force from slipping into violence and, in effect, losing its legitimacy. 19
Importantly, these three “measures” are titled according to their relationship to the act, not to the
government that orders it. And equally as important, the “purposive measure” is not related to an
abstract end such as “liberty,” “equality,” or “social justice,” but to the polity deemed capable of
achieving a certain end.
Historians may see a problem here: if the use of coercive force is well managed,
sanctioned by law, and designed to uphold an exploitative socio-economic regime, then force
would appear to lack legitimacy. If an act lacks legitimacy, then it would be necessary to label it
violence. This view tends to blur the line between means and ends as well as the distinction
between contemporary moral judgment and those of the historian. As far as the historian is
concerned then, it is necessary to recognize that if force is used to defend a certain political order
and done so within Cotta’s three “measures,” calling it violence is not analytically helpful but,
instead, is a way to pass moral judgment on the order. Historians who deem such a judgment
appropriate should critique the injustices of that regime itself, not the use of force to preserve it.20
This should provide plenty of room to analyze the methods by which force is enacted, whether a
political order is deemed oppressive and to include judgments, preferably those of
contemporaries.21 Such a distinction between the moral judgments of the historian and those of
contemporaries will became clear as the discussion moves towards the end of the first French
occupation. By 1813, Imperial force, once understood by urban elites as a necessity in the
defense of private property, slid into arbitrary acts of violence, thereby discrediting the French
regime and leading to a city-wide rejection of their presence.
19

Ibid, 82-91.

20

Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. by George Schwab (Chicago, 2007).

21

Brown, Ending the French Revolution, 374.

9

However, in the years between 1806 and 1814, French reform and policing tactics
succeeded in rupturing the traditional relationship between community, justice, and social
stability in Hamburg. Professionalized police forces emerged in the post-war environment as a
viable means through which to ensure order and defend state interest. This transformation
encompassed a similar break with the city’s traditional civic republican ethos that had defined
society and politics in early modern Hamburg. As with other republican polities, Hamburg’s
constitution and rule of law maintained a commitment to the support of the common good,
bolstered by civic virtues that stressed moral public service. It is important to note that
republicanism in Hamburg shared little in common with modern democracy as it did not entail
political equality or equal representation. As historians of Hamburg have documented at length,
the city’s republicanism functioned to preserve self-government within certain legal limits while
acting to shelter the population from arbitrary acts of the state.22 The early modern
understanding of republicanism was often described ambiguously by contemporaries and has
defied any unifying explanations by later scholars. Whereas some studies have uncovered the
intellectual underpinnings of republicanism, in order to locate the “moment” of the republic’s
emergence as a political form,23 others have stressed the complexity of the eighteenth century’s
understanding and practice of republicanism.24 And while it lacked any coherent ideology,

22

See Richard Evans, Death in Hamburg: Society and Politics in the Cholera Years (Oxford, 1987), 1-27.

23

J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Republican Thought and the Atlantic Tradition
(Princeton, 1975); Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), esp. 59-99.
24

Heinz Schilling, “Civic Republicanism in Late Medieval and Early Modern German Cities,” in Religion,
Political Culture, and the Emergence of Early Modern Society (Leiden, 1992), 3-52; Hans Erich Bödecker, “The
Concept of the Republic in Eighteenth-Century German Thought,” in Republicanism and Liberalism in American
and the German State, 1750-1850, ed. Jürgen Heideking and James Henretta (Cambridge, 2002), 35-52.
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German Central Europe nonetheless evidenced a republican tradition and a civic politics driven
by service to the “common good” (Gemeinwohl).25
Because the city of Hamburg held no allegiance to a monarch or confession,
republicanism was at the center of the city’s early modern political culture. Hamburg’s
constitution as well as its traditional political practices combined rights and civic duties and
stressed the importance of communal participation in protecting the common weal. As Mary
Lindemann has clearly shown, city residents recognized their obligations as decidedly republican
and viewed Hamburg as a community based on social and moral commitments.26 Civic and
political culture in early modern Hamburg was built upon the perceived connection between
moral considerations and politics in public life.27 An understanding of ethics and civic morality
was at the center of social and political discourse in Hamburg and regularly informed decision
making by the city’s Senate.28 The civic and ethical ethos of Hamburg’s citizens was expressed
in the celebration of the republican virtues such as patriotism, industry, frugality, and service to
the wider community. These virtues were viewed by contemporaries as fundamental elements
for a successful republic polity and were considered as one’s duty (regardless of economic or
political position) as a good republican.29

25

Rudolf Vierhaus, “Wir nennen’s Gemeinsinn (We Call it Public Spirit): Republic and Republicanism in
the German Political Discussion of the Nineteenth Century,” in Republicanism and Liberalism, 21-35; Mary
Lindemann, Patriots and Paupers: Hamburg, 1712-1830 (Oxford, 1990); Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 15-22;
26

Lindemann brilliantly connects concerns of public morality with political and economic considerations
by demonstrating the importance of Hamburg’s famed Poor Relief. Patriots and Paupers, 1-12, 48-73; Aaslestad,
Place and Politics, 32-77.
27

See Eckhart Hellmuth, “Towards a Comparative Study of Political Culture: The Case of Late EighteenthCentury England and Germany,” in Transformation of Political Culture: England and Germany in the LateEighteenth Century, ed. idem. (Oxford, 1990), 1-38; Isabel Hull, Sexuality, State, and Civil Society in Germany,
1700-1815 (Ithaca, 1996), 218-224.
28

In fact, as Mary Lindemann has shown, a successful career in the world of Hamburg politics almost
always began in the ranks of the city’s Poor Relief.
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Yet following eight years of French occupation and the destruction of the city’s economy,
the republican ethos in Hamburg began to wither. The Imperial authorities’ reliance on a
hierarchical system of policing and law enforcement in the early years of the occupation,
followed by the implementation of the Napoleonic Code in 1811, eroded communal
responsibilities by promoting an atmosphere of social and political laissez-faire. The experience
of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, an uncertain economy, increasing numbers of
refugees, and eight years of punishing occupation eventually suffocated Hamburg’s early modern
commitments to communal well-being. The necessity of survival coupled with the effects of
eight years of occupation nurtured a drive towards individual self-interest and forced a
redefinition of the common good. Rather than focusing on communal welfare and addressing the
social ills of a growing city, the post-1814 Senate fostered policies that stressed security, order,
and individual economic prosperity. As the city increasingly relied on a hierarchical and
professionalized police force to identify and control new classes of deviants, the sense of
communal responsibility waned. This new understanding of social responsibility in Hamburg
was informed by a nascent liberalism that, as Dieter Langewiesche has argued, forced the
“collective to take second place to the individual.”30 By the mid-nineteenth century, this social
laissez-faire individualism would fundamentally inform an emerging middle-class ideology.

The third chapter largely breaks with the narrative established throughout the first two,
and deals specifically with questions regarding Hamburg’s post-1814 Senate use of city space as
an arena for the representation of its authority and ideological contours. This chapter argues that
a defining feature of the nineteenth century and of the practice of modern politics is a
29

Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 19.

30

Dieter Langwiesche, “Liberalism and the Middle Class in Europe,” in Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im 19.
Jahrhundert, ed. Jürgen Köcka (Göttingen, 1987), 61. See also Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 23 n.63.
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politicization of public space. While Hamburg’s lower classes (its journeymen and unskilled
workers) had taken to the streets to defend hard-won, traditional economic rights, their
grievances clearly lacked any real political significance and focused on assaulting (and insulting)
symbolic targets.31 This was the case throughout virtually all of early modern Europe.32 Yet
during the revolutionary era, when concepts such as right-bearing individualism and popular
sovereignty emerged, public space was transformed into a dense “marketplace” of competing
representations of the body politic. Imperial administrators, “awakened” religious
commentators, German citizen-patriots, and, finally, Hamburg’s conservative elite, all vied for
control over public opinion as well as the symbols of post-Napoleonic citizenship and
sovereignty. It is this chapter’s central contention that the politicization of public space marks a
fundamental divide between the political and social worlds of early modern Europe and the
nineteenth century.
In breaking with the narrative style of the previous chapters, chapter three is better able to
investigate such instances of state ceremony. It also functions as a critical assessment of Jürgen
Habermas’s well-known formulation of the rise of the public sphere. More specifically, the
chapter deals to a large extent with Habermas’s concept of “representative publicness” (or, the
way in which medieval and early modern authority is re-presented, publically before the people),
and argues that such a concept is applicable to the study of the German nineteenth century.
Contrary to Habermas’s contention that critical-rational debate and the subsequent division
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between the private and public spheres made such public representations of authority politically
hollow, this chapter argues that Hamburg’s returning Senate, in fact, routinely used public space
as a setting for the display of authority and legitimacy. City-wide military parades, award and
religious ceremonies, and dramatic reenactments of important events, were all ways that
Hamburg’s Senate publically (and dramatically) presented itself before the city’s inhabitants.
These bits of spectacle also allowed the Senate, and the socio-economic order it represented,
symbolically to enact the ideological underpinnings of its rule. These events tied the sacred and
secular realms together as the Senate positioned itself as the defenders of order, security, and
traditional authority.
In a speech he delivered to the Convention on 7 May 1794, Robespierre declared that
“Man is nature’s greatest phenomenon, and the most magnificent of all spectacles is that of a
large popular festival.”33 Republican holidays, celebrated from the very beginning of the
Revolution, consisted of mass processions that wound their way through Paris to sites charged
with political meaning. The accompanying neoclassical pomp of such spectacles came through
the addition of triumphal arches and secular alters designed by Jacques-Louis David. Yet, after
the fall of Robespierre and the Jacobin regime, such collective celebrations abruptly ended as the
effects of State control began to counter participatory zeal. Under Napoleon, parades had
become pure displays of state power and authority, and citizens had become mere spectators. A
chance for a truly organic and participatory style of politics was lost as order, security, and the
defense of private property became the state’s fundamental concern.
This would prove to be a legacy of French occupation in the city of Hamburg as well as
much of Europe, seeing its ultimate expression in the revolutionary regimes of the Soviet Union
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and Nazi Germany. After 1814, Hamburg’s Senate moved quickly to secure a monopolization of
the means of coercion, routinely associated itself with its military through parades and award
ceremonies, and relied on highly-choreographed spectacle as a means through which to represent
its claims to legitimacy and authority. In the post-Napoleonic world, authority, legitimacy, and
sovereignty could no longer be justified or guaranteed by right or tradition; modern politics
necessitates the ability of the state to defend its claim to authority through the use, or threatened
use, of force. And while we today are no longer subject to overwhelming displays of state might,
as we tend to prefer reasoned and practical debate to being put in awe, these themes are
undoubtedly present in the modern political cultures of the West, as staged political
performances still resonate with citizen-spectators, though other popular media platforms have
come to replace the market square.
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Chapter 1
The French Empire in Hamburg and the Introduction of
Modern Police Reform, 1806-1813
While Hamburg flourished financially amid the upheavals of the 1790s, by the turn of the
century the city had become an unwilling actor in an altered international arena. Continental
warfare had come to threaten the independent republic's livelihood, forcing Hamburg to join with
the Hanseatic cities of Bremen and Lübeck in order to maintain their neutral, free-trade status.
According to Katherine Aaslestad, this redefinition of the republic's status entailed a broadening
of Hamburg's local character into a regional, Hanseatic identity.34 Contrary to what historians
had argued well into the 1990s, a bourgeoning sense of German nationalism had little resonance
in the regions that suffered under Napoleonic occupation.35 Rather, entire regions, such as
Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg, rallied around identities provided by religion, traditional
authority, and ancient freedoms.36 In the cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, a Hanseatic
Legion was assembled in order to fight the French, not due to early stirrings of German-ness, but
in defense of the cities’ claim to independent status and common concerns regarding the
continuation of free trade. Emerging from the Wars of Napoleon in ruins, the Hanseatic cities
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maintain and reinforced this new “regionalist” or territorial identity, one that was often at odds
with nineteenth-century nationalist movements.37
Nonetheless, in the years between 1806 and 1813, the French occupation of Hamburg
replaced the city’s archaic and decentralized administrative structure with one characterized by
Gallic centralization and rigor. One part of this process was a redefinition of “policing,” one
which ultimately swept away Hamburg's multiple police agencies and created a single,
professionalized, and armed police force, charged solely with the execution of government
policy. In the process of installing a professionalized policing agency, the French also
inadvertently showcased to Hamburg's authorities the political uses of centralized armed force.
This new institution, a product of French occupation, would come to symbolize political
authority in new, highly public, and militarized ways. The government’s turn to increased use of
coercive means also entailed a redefinition of their notions of “order” and “legitimacy” in postoccupied Hamburg. Throughout the eighteenth century, the policing of Hamburg’s public still
connoted correction, the educating of poor children, and the moral improvement of adults.
French occupation, however, stripped policing of its function as social caretaker, and focused it
instead on the creation, control, and punishment of urban deviants.
Although historians have investigated the role which a decade of economic warfare
played in the consolidation of this regionalist, post-war identity, they have not thoroughly
investigated the effect of French occupation on the political culture of post-war urban
governments. By the end of 1814, French reform had altered the way in which Hamburg's
functionaries articulated and defended their authority, as well as the way in which they would
relate to the city's inhabitants throughout the nineteenth century. The French occupation, then,
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was crucial not solely in terms of its economically exploitative nature, but also because French
reform “modernized” conceptions of political authority by making power contingent on the
state’s monopolization of coercive means.38

Napoleon and Central Europe

In 1801, the treaty of Lunéville forced the Holy Roman Emperor, Francis II, to recognize
France’s conquest of the left bank of the Rhine, confirming France’s increasing influence in
Central Europe and initiating Austria’s retreat from Imperial politics. The signing of Lunéville
codified the terminal conditions of the Empire and secured the radical territorial realignment of
Central Europe that had begun in 1797 with the signing of Campo Formio.39 Beginning with the
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss in April 1803, Napoleon, with the nominal support of the
Reichstag, began the political and geographic reorganization of German Central Europe,
collapsing some 300 polities into fewer than forty. Furthermore, after Napoleon’s military
victory over a combined Russo-Austrian army on 2 December 1805 at Austerlitz, the east lay
open to further French expansion. The territorial realignments undertaken in 1803 were
furthered by Napoleon’s proposal to create a new confederation of German states in 1806.
38

The literature on “modernization” in Germany is enormous. This author found the following especially
insightful: Wolfgang Hardtwig, “Der deutsche Weg in die Moderne. Die Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen als
Grundproblem der deutschen Geschichte, 1789-1871,” in Deutschlands Weg in die Moderne. Politik, Gesellschaft
und Kultur in 19.Jahrhundert, eds., Wolfgang Hardtwig and Harm-Hinrich Brandt (Munich, 1993), 9-31; John
Breuilly, “Napoleonic Germany and State Formation,” in Collaboration and Resistance, 135-42; Michael Rowe,
“Napoleon and the 'Modernization' of Germany,” in Napoleon and his Empire, 202-20. Regarding the state’s
monopolization of force, see H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford,
1991), 71-90; Charles Tilly, Coercion, 1-62; Charles Tilly “Entanglements of European Cities and States,” in Cities
and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000-1800, eds., Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans (Boulder, CO, 1994):
1-28.
39

Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin, Vom Deutschen Reich zum Deutschen Bund (Göttingen, 1980); Sheehan,
235-50; Alexander Grab, Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe (New York, 2003), 85-111; Eric Brose,
German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich (Oxford, 1997); Tim
Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory: The Five Revolutions that made Modern Europe (London, 2008), 635-6; Tim
Blanning, The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787-1802 (London, 1996), 259; John Gagliardo, Reich and Nation: The
Holy Roman Empire as Idea and Reality, 1763-1806 (Bloomington, 1996), see part IV.

18

Designed to consolidate his military, diplomatic, and financial domination over Central Europe,
Napoleon’s proposed confederation served as a counterweight to Austrian influence and as a
buffer-zone between France and the eastern powers. On 16 July 1806, sixteen Central European
states formed the Confederation of the Rhine (Rheinbund) under French control.40 In the process
of redrawing the map of Central Europe, Napoleon promoted the expansion of larger states at the
expense of small- and middling-sized territories and separated these member states from the
Reich, rendering the imperial crown virtually meaningless. On 6 August 1806, Francis II, the
fifty-fourth Holy Roman Emperor since Charlemagne, abdicated his imperial title, bringing the
1006-year-old empire to its end.
While the Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck had maintained their
political and economic independence, it became increasingly clear by the middle of 1806 that the
threat of French hegemony in northern Europe was becoming serious.41 Many Hamburgers
looked towards Prussia to guarantee Hamburg’s independence, and some even suggested joining
the Prussian-led Confederation of the North. Most, however, continued to support the city’s
neutral stance as France offered assurances throughout the summer of 1806 that Hamburg’s
sovereignty and independence would be respected.42 That fall, despite longstanding clashes of
interest and intermittent competition, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck announced the first
Hanseatic Conference, from which was formed an official Hanseatic Federation. Motivated
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largely by self-preservation and based on a common commercial past, the Federation, styled as a
revival of a centuries-old political and economic arrangement, reaffirmed the cities’ neutral
status as well as their central role in world trade.43 The Conference adopted a common seal,
created guidelines for a yearly Hanseatic Bundestag, and outlined future legal and economic
reform.44 Even so, the new Federation was at a significant strategic and economic disadvantage,
lacking the force necessary to defend their neutrality. Despite their legacy of autonomy and
“enlightened cosmopolitan rationalism,” the Hanseatic Federation’s insistence that the cities
independence was good for Europe as a whole ultimately proved insufficient to halt French
expansion northward.45
Prussia, facing French encirclement, declared war on the Napoleonic Empire in early
autumn 1806. The French double victory at the battles of Jena and Auerstädt decided the fate of
the Hanseatic cities. On 6-7 November 1806 a combined French army of approximately 53,000
troops stormed the gates of Lübeck. The 21,000 Prussians left to defend the city were crushed
after three hours of savage hand-to-hand and house-by-house fighting. The brutality of the
Napoleonic Wars had finally reached the neutral Hanseatic cities. Both Hamburg and Bremen
surrendered peacefully to the French two weeks later. On 19 November French forces, under the
command of Marshal Édouard Adolphe Casimir Jospeh Mortier, marched into the city of
Hamburg, where they would maintain a presence until 1814.
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The tone of French occupation had, however, been set by Mortier on the previous day.
Encamped just south-east of Hamburg in the town of Bergedorf, he announced to Hamburg's
Senate that while strict discipline would be maintained and property would be respected, the
housing and feeding of his forces and the “pains of living expense” would be passed on to the
city's inhabitants.46 Mortier required the quartering of 2,600 Dutch and Spanish Imperial
soldiers, their French officers, and over 700 horses.47 Quarters were made available just outside
the city walls in the districts of Steintors and St. Georg, and as regiments of Spanish and, in early
December, Italian soldiers poured into Hamburg, stalls, cellars and attics were requisitioned
throughout the city.48 In addition to the quartering, residents were responsible for providing
soldiers and officers with three meals a day. Daily rations of French wine, beer, and brandy were
added to their demands for meat, vegetables, soup and bread.49 Monetary allowances for officers
(especially on weekends), as well as special housing in the expensive hotels in Hamburg's
wealthiest districts, drove the initial cost of occupation higher still. The French also forced the
city's inhabitants to procure coats, boots and medical supplies for occupying soldiers.50 As one
local commented, the influx of Imperial soldiers and the growing importance of military affairs
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within the city walls had transformed the once prosperous commercial entrepôt into a military
encampment.51
According to Napoleon, the occupation of Hamburg was of great political and military
importance, but his true motive was made clear on 21 November with the announcement of the
Berlin Decrees.52 This set of decrees ultimately laid the foundation for Napoleon’s Continental
System, which sought to combat Britain's lucrative trade with the continent. The capture of
Hamburg, Britain's main commercial port in Europe, was central to Napoleon's plans for
economic warfare. Trade with Britain had risen nearly tenfold between the years 1789 and 1800,
and while commercial ties had seen a few years of stagnation, most notably 1799 and 1803,
Hamburg remained a “thorn in Napoleon's side.”53 Even though the city's trade included products
from French and Spanish colonies that were valuable to both France and its allies, Napoleon
increasingly regarded Hanseatic trade as a vital British interest which must be strangled.54 As
such, on 21 November, Colonel Jean-Baptist Lecat de Bazancourt announced that within twentyfour hours the Berlin Decrees would go into effect.55 One week later, French authorities stated
that all unsold British property would be immediately confiscated and that no communication
between Hamburg and British industry would be tolerated. In addition, all correspondence with
Britain was forbidden, and no British man, woman, or child was allowed into or through
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Hamburg.56 Following on the heels of the Berlin Decrees, Napoleon's Milan Decrees extended
trade limitations to neutral shipping and opened up economic warfare on the Atlantic. As Paul
Schroeder has persuasively argued, the real target of the Continental System was Europe itself,
as Napoleon sought to further stamp French hegemony onto the continent.57

French Military Occupation, 1806-1810
Hamburg’s Senate offered little resistance to the demands made by the Imperial
occupation. Eager to continue trade and to mitigate the city's financial burden, the Senate
implored its residents to maintain peace and order and to comply with the French military, the
first regular, armed, and “modern” policing force in the city's history. All orders from occupying
soldiers were to be taken “quietly and obediently,” including prohibitions against large public
gatherings.58 Male heads of households were charged by Hamburg’s Senate with keeping good
order not only within the home, but also by monitoring the public comings and goings of their
dependents. Any verbal or physical engagement with occupying forces, unless one's business
demanded it, was severely restricted.59 Those who defied these pronouncements would
immediately be subject to French military justice, as the Senate refused to jeopardize the city's
56
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welfare in order to protect rebellious citizens.60 Resistance to the growing number of Imperial
authorities and occupation forces soon seemed impossible, if not entirely unwelcome.61 In an
examination of popular songs from the first years of occupation, Katherine Aaslestad found that
many focused entirely on the welfare of the city and showed no expectations that Napoleon's
Grand Army would soon depart.62 The public’s appeal to the welfare of the community indicates
that the city’s inhabitants were well aware of their precarious position. The Senate’s decision to
place the city’s well-being above the interest of specific individuals shows both a keen
understanding of the situation and a desire to maintain some form of authority during a military
occupation.
Yet the Senate’s reaction also hints at future developments in the course of Imperial
occupation in Hamburg. While major restructuring of Hamburg's administrative and policing
structure were years away, policing in Hamburg almost immediately took on a more modern
face. Up until 1806, policing in Hamburg operated according to the older models that stressed
the values of guidance, correction, and instruction common throughout most of early modern
Europe. 63 Policing not only denoted domestic policy (as compared to foreign or military affairs),
but, as Marc Raeff argues, it sought to “elevate society to a higher level . . . by promoting the
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common good.”64 The highest authority in early-modern cities, in Hamburg, the Rat, was the
institution ultimately responsible for the outlining of police policy and law. In Hamburg, police
duties were generally outlined by three basic statutes, yet it was ultimately the daily decisions
(numbering in the thousands) made by the Rat that came to shape policy.65 The “agents of
policing” were mandated to carry out police laws, but also to shape policy into precedent for
future action. In Hamburg, the organization most responsible for policing and the administering
of social policy was the Wedde, composed of four senators, and the two praetors, or city
magistrates. However, virtually all departments of Hamburg’s government as well as many
“private” charitable organizations maintained some policing powers.66 Authority was often
wielded summarily as the absence of formal legal processes left punishment to the discretion of
individuals and private institutions. 67
Within the first few years of occupation, “to police” lost its connotation of policy-making
and was limited to the more narrowly-defined realm of policy execution: control and punishment
remained as guidance and improvement increasingly lost their resonance. The French military,
under the control of commander-in-chief Marshal Brune, French Consul Lachevardiére, and
Minister Louis-Antoine Fauvelet de Bourriene, was tasked with the policing of the population on
a day-to-day basis. Soldiers soon began drilling in public squares and patrolling city streets and
city gates during the day and after nightfall. The French cavalry made its first official
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appearance in December, as 500 officers and their horses marched slowly throughout the city,
requiring the military to shut down not only several major thoroughfares, but also to police the
parade route.68 Furthermore, French military courts, swift and extralegal even by standards of
the time,69 were in effect no later than December of that year. While no records survive of the
courts’ early activity, judging by the Senate's promise to turn malcontents over to the military,
the threat of French justice was real.70 Within the first month of the occupation, then, a new
relationship between Hamburg's inhabitants and armed authority was slowly beginning to take
shape, a process that would only accelerate throughout the next few years. And while the French
administration allowed private charitable organizations, such Hamburg’s famed Poor Relief, to
continue their work, these local institutions had their powers of policing drastically curtailed and
limited to the execution of French policy.71
In the early years of occupation, the French military undermined its own efforts through
its willingness to accept the bribes of local merchants. By the end of 1806, Minister Bourrienne
received over 558,000 francs in bribes and, by early 1810, had amassed a sizable fortune. These
activities led Napoleon to recall him to Paris later that year. Within the first months of 1807,
Hamburg merchants had already paid military authorities 1.5 million francs for them to turn a
blind eye toward trade on the Elbe.72 Trade with Britain was still a thriving enterprise, so much
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Fig. 2. Christoph Suhr, A painting of douaniers in Hamburg, watercolor, 1809.
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so, that an 1807 police report suggested that “trade with English goods in the city continues as
prior to the decree.”73 Smuggling English goods between Hamburg and its Danish neighbor,
Altona, was also becoming a very lucrative business. As the system of smuggling became
increasingly sophisticated, French officials likewise sharpened their methods for combating this
black market trade, leading to what historian Jean Mistler has described as a guerrilla war
between Hamburgers and custom agents.74 In Hamburg, French military patrols increased and a
swarm of green-jacketed dounaiers (custom agents), who became the despised icons of Imperial
oppression, descended upon the city. By the end of 1807, over 300 dounaiers had arrived in
Hamburg, establishing a visible presence on the docks and at the city's gates. Unable to slow the
flood of illicit goods that poured into the city via Altona, French authorities announced a
program to register all legal citizens and inhabitants of the city and its suburbs, in order to limit
the number of outsiders who entered the city. 75 Given no more than eight days to register,
citizens of Hamburg had to show proof of residency, while all those born outside the city (but
who legally resided there) were required to state where they were born, where they were staying,
and what their current profession was.76 Later that year, Hamburg's Senate was “advised” by the
French that the local authorities would be required to maintain a presence at city gates to spot
smugglers.77
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As Hamburg's wealth now served the French war effort, so too did its press. Throughout
most of Central Europe at the time, Napoleon and his administrators sought to control the press
in order to publicize French orders and announcements.78 In the first years of the occupation, a
number of Hamburg's newspapers and journals were forced to close shop, either because they
were unable to afford the steep French press tax or because they withered under strict
censorship.79 Those that had not closed were known by locals to be under strict police
supervision.80 In numerous warnings from the Senate, Hamburg's public was explicitly
instructed not to complain in print (or otherwise) about a French-controlled press.81 As one
Hamburg resident claimed, by 1808 “all liberty of the press is lost and none dares to speak
politiks [sic], which to tell the truth are at present nothing but reports and false news.”82 Imperial
administrators used Hamburg's press in the hopes of persuading locals to the benefits of the
Napoleonic Code, which, by late 1807, was slowly being introduced to the city.83 As Katherine
Aaslestad has noted, a number of newspapers pushed a “subtext” that sought to give voice to a
sense of German cultural nationalism by glorifying common cultural themes. Yet none of this,
she continues, could be said to have offered a “call to national resistance” against French
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authorities.84 Napoleon's determination to control the press throughout his growing Empire was
a move not only to dictate and mold public opinion, but also to take opinion out of the hands of
the public in order for it to better serve the interests of France. Publicity and manufactured
consent, then, were key aspects of the French occupation in Hamburg that would eventually
come to serve post-war regimes throughout Europe. In a century that would come to rely on the
printed word for its understanding of the world, control over public discourse was a fundamental
aspect of state control.85 Surveillance of Hamburg’s press and the suppression of subversive
material (pamphlets, newspaper, and woodcuts) would be among the top priorities for French
police agents throughout the entire occupation.
But authorities in Hamburg did not rely on the press alone to publicize their regime. In a
series of choreographed celebrations of Imperial power, the French reinforced their authority
through a selective use of city space and public spectacle. While Imperial soldiers drilling in city
markets under the inspection of Military Governor Marshall Brune impressed local notables for
their professionalism as well as for their “handsome” uniforms, these parades lacked the pomp
that later processionals would soon begin to incorporate.86 On 15 August 1807, Marshal Jean
Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo, along with the Marquis de la Romana,87 led a military
procession through the streets of Hamburg in celebration of Napoleon's birthday. To the sound
of drums and trumpets, Imperial soldiers, dressed in full uniforms, marched from Hamburg's
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Heiligengeistfeld, the parade field located just outside the city walls, to the Alster via Hamburg's
main promenades. The Imperial eagle was hung from lamp-posts and building facades along the
route of the parade, adding further symbolic weight to the day’s events. The entire event was
brought to a close with the ringing of Hamburg’s church bells and a spectacular fireworks
display over the Alster.88
As Burghart Schmidt has argued, this event reinforced to Hamburg's inhabitants that the
city had become a military depot, but attention should be drawn to such events for several other
reasons as well. On the one hand, Imperial spectacle in Hamburg necessitated that law and order
to be maintained not by decree alone but, visibly, by the police. In preparation for Napoleon's
birthday in August of 1809, the French began cordoning off sections of the city, reserving
Hamburg's most busy thoroughfares for use by French officers alone. Travel throughout the city
was restricted, carriages were not allowed on the main streets, and only those on foot were
allowed access to the festivities. Special police posts were erected on all major intersections
where the festivities would be held and security at city gates was increased so as to manage the
expected flow of traffic.89 On the day of the celebration, a procession of over 3,000 soldiers
wound its way through the city, eventually ending on Hamburg's illustrious Jungfernstieg (Fig.
11) where the Emperor was honored with a fire-works display over the Alster. Not only was this
costly spectacle paid for by the city, it was also mandatory that all inhabitants attend.90 The
French military was in full force, there to ensure both the smooth running of the celebration and
that everyone was able to witness the “Illumination.” The city's inhabitants, then, had to be
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ushered through designated viewing areas, as no one was allowed to stand still and watch,
regardless of her or his status.
Police presence at these events not only gave the appearance of law and order but, more
importantly, helped shape the way in which Hamburg's inhabitants experienced the spectacle.
As historians of urban spectacle have argued, individuals may, in fact, “read” such events
through their own idiosyncratic lens, and as such, “official discourse” may not be totalizing or
complete.91 But it is necessary to note the length to which French authorities, by publicizing and
regulating of these events and by directing the public's collective gaze, went in their attempt to
stamp the spectacle with a sense of legitimacy and to imbue them with a distinct meaning. Also,
it is important to recognize the centrality of such “ceremonies of power” in the reproduction of
authority and the “creation and perpetuation of political legitimacy.”92 Whereas the form
employed by the French Empire had its roots in age-old performances of power, the parade’s
content relied on distinct emotional and cognitive aspects to impart a particular political
meaning. The symbolic content Imperial spectacle utilized was designed to legitimize both
French authority in occupied territories and to interpolate or produce a distinct political subject.
Hamburgers were repeatedly addressed as “citizens” of the French Empire not only through a
distinct legal and political rhetoric but through scripted ceremonies. 93 Making attendance
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mandatory with no special allowances based on one’s social status highlights the continuation of
the Revolutionary ideals regarding the suppression of hierarchies, so closely associated with
festivals of the French Revolution that celebrated the political nation.94 While unitary citizenship
had not yet been made de jour, as it would by the instituting of the Napoleonic Code in 1811, all
Hamburg’s residents were, through their identical participation in the spectacle, being
contextualized as citizens of the polis, regardless of their past status.

The Continental System and the Increase of the French Military Presence

Despite the increased Imperial presence in Northern Germany, the Continental System
would never stop trade on the seas, nor would it ever be able to contend with the sheer amount of
illicit trade on land.95 Instead, the “guerrilla war” continued, the number of customs agents and
military patrols increased, and smugglers relied on even riskier schemes. Arrests skyrocketed, so
much so that by 1810 more than thirty individuals a day were arrested for smuggling, prompting
Napoleon to strengthen his military presence in Hamburg. The Billeting Deputation, initially
created in late 1808 and consisting of senators and citizens, now had to cope with over 200,000
Imperial administrators, officers and soldiers, lodged in domestic quarters.96 The military's
heightened presence was marked by increased patrols and new policing ordinances that sought to
re-order city space in a more “rational,” streamlined manner. For example, in March 1810,
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Fig. 3. “Take a pick, take a pick; six douaniers for a penny.” Dutch cartoon from 1808.
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Imperial authorities, in an attempt to regulate the traffic both within the city and at the city gates,
issued orders for the military to begin regulating the flow of those on carriage as well as those on
foot. In what amounts to modern traffic laws, incoming and outgoing traffic was differentiated
and relegated to its own side of the street. Those on foot were expected to keep out of the streets
and, whenever entering or leaving the city, were directed to separate pedestrian entrances.97 This
rationalizing of city space not only allowed for the increased surveillance of the urban
population, it also led to an increase in the effectiveness of the douaniers. Customs agents were
now instructed to check all those who moved through the city gates, demanding that each
individual remove hats, stockings, footwear and even false limbs; some were forced to disrobe
entirely.98
French administrators did not limit their spatial reconstructing to just the city gates. The
entire city was re-imagined along the lines of Napoleon’s model for France. Hamburg officials
had, since 1614, divided the city into districts according to parish in order to fill the ranks of the
Burgerwäche.99 In the late 1780s, as an attempt to erase much of Hamburg’s “geographical
Babel,” and to better investigate and combat poverty with the city, the Rat ordered the naming of
streets and began assigning numbers to houses.100 But in the early months of 1810, the French
reorganized the city into separate cantons, each run by its own police commissioner.101 A police
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senator, or the “General Director of Police” as he would be known after 1811, sat at the head of
the entire city's police force. All local authority was in the hands of the French with a few
positions offered to pre-occupation local authorities, a structure that was comparable throughout
the Empire at large.102 The Imperial authorities liquidated Hamburg's Bürgerwache, as well as
the city's praetorship, an ancient position that had combined administration with the distribution
of justice.103 This effectively eliminated Hamburg’s redundant crime-controlling agencies while
simultaneously limiting the number of individuals and institutions responsible for meting out
justice. The remapping of the city and the unifying of the police forced a separation between
those who formulated policy and those who executed it, a fundamental divide mirrored
throughout the French Empire. This professionalized and bureaucratized police force was now
able to maintain a consistent, armed, and public presence that not only represented Imperial
authority throughout the city but also lent a sense of legitimacy to the regime as the source of law
and order. This practice continued under Hamburg’s post-occupation government.
In September 1810, French authorities announced all official proclamations were to be
printed in both German and French, a practice that would continue until the very end of Imperial
occupation.104 By November 1810, the French authorities were issuing no fewer than two and as
many as five new proclamations a week, all intended to rationalize Hamburg's law codes and to
stamp French authority on the city. Regulations against large public gatherings were
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strengthened, the harboring of foreign soldiers was elevated to a serious crime, and the
confiscation of private stores of gunpowder began in earnest.105 In December, Napoleon
announced that Hamburg had become a Kaiserlicher Gerichtshof (Cour Impériale), a major legal
hub for the northern region that included the cities of Bremen, Lübeck, Lüneburg, Osnabrück,
and Minden. In the coming months, Hamburg's juridical institutions would undergo a significant
overhaul, providing the city with a standardized legal procedure that was organized around
Napoleon’s model for “administrative uniformity” throughout the Empire.106
Napoleon's 1810 Decrees of Trianon and Fontainebleau increased police pressure on
illegal trade with Britain and sought to discourage smuggling by raising Imperial tariffs in order
to benefit French manufacture. In order to make smuggling work for the French treasury,
licenses were now issued for the import and export of crucial raw materials.107 A customs court,
and the establishment of the death penalty for the transportation of illegal goods, was instituted
as part of the ongoing struggle against smuggling in Hamburg.108 Imperial authorities soon
began a widespread campaign to capture and burn British goods. On 16 November 1810,
Imperial authorities confiscated over 800,000 francs worth of contraband and, in what would be
the first of many such events, burned every item in a large bonfire in the town of Grassbrook,
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Fig. 4. Christoph Suhr, Burning of English goods by French soldiers on 16 November, 1810.
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just outside Hamburg's walls.109 The bonfires themselves were highly publicized events and,
while not compulsory, were usually well-attended. By the end of the year, British goods had
been burned in Ritzebüttel and Harburg, both suburbs of Hamburg, as well as in Bremen.
Shipping came to a virtual standstill as 300 ships sat idle in the harbor, bringing ruin to a city
whose livelihood depended on trade.110
The destruction of Hamburg's economy, and with it, much of northern Germany's,
certainly underscores the exploitative nature of French hegemony.111 But it also points towards
the emergence of a highly visible organizational structure that was increasingly able to provide
the security and centralization that the Imperial regime now required. The implementation of the
Continental System, as well as control over passports, the press, and the theaters, became the
exclusive domain of the General Director of Police, M. Brun d'Aubignosc, who sat atop a linear
chain of command and controlled a web of informants. As the administration settled into
prominent locations throughout the city, the Imperial regime's consistent, public presence
reinforced for the city's inhabitants both the source and force of French authority. Beginning in
late 1810 then, and completed no later than July 1811, all local authority had passed into the
hands of a new, centralized French administration. Stripping policing of its centuries-old
instructional tendencies, the French used its police force not only to maintain order but, more
importantly, to represent Imperial authority throughout the city. This transition, as Frank Hatje
has argued, represents a fundamental aspect of the nineteenth-century's centralized and
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militarized power-states (Machtstaat).112 And while Hamburg itself could never compete with
the Great- or Middle-states within post-war Germany, it too was beginning the transition into a
substantially more modern and sovereign city-state whose monopolization of coercive means
would secure the Senate’s legitimacy. For Hatje, Hamburg’s nineteenth-century dual processes
of centralization and bureaucratization, or Etatismus, required the unification of policing powers
under the sole authority of the Senate. This monopolization of armed force, a process
accelerated by French reform, served as the foundation of Hamburg’s sovereignty and autonomy
in a period of crisis in May and June 1814, as well as during its restoration as a sovereign citystate within the German Confederation immediately following the Congress of Vienna in
1815.113
“Bonne Ville de L'Empire Française” 1811-1813

In preparation for his war against Russia and part of the ongoing struggle with Britain,
Napoleon decided, on 13 December 1810, to annex the whole of the northern-German coast into
the French Empire.114 Incorporated in January 1811, the northern coast became part of
Napoleon's Thirty-Second Military District, eventually to be composed of three departments: the
Ems Supérieur, Bouches de Wéser, and Bouches de l'Elbe. The Imperial eagle immediately
replaced Hamburg’s ancient ensign of a white, tri-towered castle on a red field on all
newspapers, public buildings, and proclamations, visibly announcing Hamburg’s lost
independence. The city became a “bonne ville de l'Empire française” and underwent a series of
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changes that saw the wholesale replacement of its sprawling administrative structures with
centralized French institutions. In addition, the annexation also entailed a literal restructuring of
the urban environment that would not only change the face of the city but would also change the
way Hamburg's inhabitants experienced their surroundings and related to their government. As
Imperial administrators settled into prominent locations throughout Hamburg, institutions, such
as the police bureau, recruitment offices, or tax collection agencies, and the buildings in which
they were housed, took on new meanings that would resonate throughout the nineteenth century.
While some French reform was discarded after 1814 and 1815, the years between 1811 and1813
drastically altered the relationship between Hamburg's inhabitants, their environment, and their
local government.
The details regarding Hamburg's new role as an Imperial administrative city were laid out
by French officials in a series of proclamations throughout late December 1810 and early
January 1811. The city was to become the capital of a military district that extended to the
Dutch, Danish, and Mecklenburg borders, and included the cities of Bremen, Lübeck, Minden,
Osnabrück, and, after 1812, Wissenburg.115 Hamburg would not only house the entire general
staff of Napoleon’s thirty-second military division, but the city was now a legal and
administrative center, with offices for the navy, post, customs, and tariffs. And while this new
position as an Imperial capital increased Hamburg’s regional influence, it crushed any hope that
the former republic would maintain its status as an independent city.116 Arriving in Hamburg in
February 1811, Marshall Louis Nicolas Davout, Duke of Auerstädt and Prince of Eckmühl,
immediately assumed the position of General Governor and Chief Commander of the new
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Fig. 5. Johann Marcus David, “Prospect of the Imperial French City of Hamburg,” watercolor, 1811
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provinces.117 One of Napoleon’s most loyal marshals,118 Davout was charged with the
wholesale replacement of Hamburg’s constitution and local institutions with a new Imperial
administration. Within the first month of his tenure, Davout abolished Hamburg’s Senate and
Citizen’s Council and named a new conseil municipal headed by a French prefect. By July, “an
army of French administrators,” under the direction of Privy Councils François Louis René
Mouchard de Chaban and Faure, had settled into the city and put into motion the organizational
and legal bodies that would govern Hamburg until the very end of occupation.119
By the end of July 1811, virtually all local authority had been transferred to a new French
administration with the positions of Prefect, General Director of Police, and General Intendant of
the Interior and Finance held by Barnon de Coninck-Outrive, M. Brun d’Aubingnosc, and Count
Chaban, respectively. This transfer of power from Hamburg’s sprawling government to a
“rationalized and centralized” Imperial administration re-shaped the ways in which local citizens
experienced the city’s physical and political landscape.120 The General Director of Police of the
Hanseatic department, d’Aubignosc, now in charge of enforcing the Continental System and
control over passports, the local press, and public opinion, located his new office in Hamburg’s
former Freemason’s lodge. The mayor and the municipal administration moved their
headquarters to Goertz Palace, a building once used to serve the representatives of the Holy
Roman Empire, and re-named it the Hôtel de Mairie. Ironically, as Frank Hatje has noted, the
117

The announcement of Davout’s arrival was made on 27 December, 1810 along with an outline of his
titles and function as General Governor. See Altonaischer Mercurius, Nr. 207, 27 December, 1810.
118

After destroying a Prussian army at Jena in 1806, Napoleon named Davout “Duke of Auerstädt,” a title
that included a German estate, a princely salary, a chateau in the Loire Valley, and a town house in Paris. The title
of “Prince of Eckmühl” was bestowed upon him in 1809. See John G. Gallaher, Iron Marshal: A Biography of
Louis N. Davout (Carbondale, IL., 1976).
119

Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 246; Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter, 421-99; Wolf-Rüdiger Osburg, Die
Verwaltung Hamburgs in der Franzosenzeit, 1811-1814 (Frankfurt am Main, 1988). Chaban died in March 1814
after purposefully exposing himself to a “hospital fever” on account of his “grief” and “disapointments.”
120

Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 248.

43

Imperial regime’s appropriation of this building to represent a modern, centralized state,
effectively returned Hamburg to the status of an Imperial city.121 It was here, at the Hôtel, that
Hamburg’s residents would eventually experience the French-style administration, as it would
house taxation and finance, military recruitment and quartering offices, city police offices, and
birth and death records once held by local churches.122 The re-location of these new government
institutions to prominent locations not only invested these buildings with symbolic, secular
weight, the move also lent French authorities legitimacy and sense of continuity with the past.
A central feature of the new regime was the separation of the executive branch from the
judicial, which entailed the creation of a new hierarchy of local and imperial courts as well as
standardized statutes and legal procedure. As a major legal center of the French Empire,
Hamburg was named the capital of the newly created Départment de l’Ems Oriental on 20
August 1811.123 Located in the chief city of every arrondissement, of which Hamburg was one,
were the Courts of First Instance, charged with the application of correctional and civil justice.
The members of the Courts of First Instance worked in association with deputies, appointed by
the Imperial government, to initiate court cases in departmental Tribunals.124 Each Tribunal
consisted of twelve appointed judges, a president and vice president, and two Zivilkammer, or
courts of appeal. These courts were located in every department throughout the empire and tried
local criminal cases with fines rarely exceeding 200 francs.125 In every canton, of which
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Hamburg had six, was the Friedengericht, consisting of one judge and two deputies (members of
the municipal police department) who were given the authority to fine and incarcerate
individuals. In September 1811, an assize court (Schwurgericht) was instituted in Hamburg with
five judges and one president, and was charged with the enforcement of all Imperial decrees,
including the implementation of the Napoleonic Code, which would increasingly come to bear
on the lives of the city’s inhabitants.126 Headed by Monsieur de premier President de la Cour
P.F.H DeSerre, the centralized Imperial judicial system required the work of hundreds of
lawyers, civil servants, and law enforcement officials, many of who were recruited from
Hamburg’s pre-existing government, but all of whom were now reliant on the Imperial regime’s
success for their livelihood. 127 And while a number of Hamburgers joined in the hopes of
softening the impact of French reform on the city, most collaborated with the Imperial regime to
further their own careers or feed their families during a time of severe economic crisis.128
With the full introduction of the Napoleonic Code by the beginning of 1812, all remnants
of Hamburg’s feudal past were erased from legal practice. In an Imperial decree, signed on 26
August 1811, to go into effect no later than November of that year, the French abolished all
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remaining conditions of feudalism through the northern-German departments.129 The legal
distinction between those who lived within Hamburg’s walls (Stadtwohnern) and those who
resided in the countryside (Landwohnern) was replaced with unitary citizenship for all
Hamburgers; this included a political enfranchisement for all male citizens in electing the local
judiciary.130 In addition, all honorific titles (or “titles of superiority”) were officially banned
along with the landowner’s right of dispensing exemplary justice in the countryside. A new
Imperial commission was created to both ensure adequate police presence and standard legal
procedure outside the city’s walls, and to punish those who continued to use force either against
fellow Germans or the institutions of Imperial authority.131 And finally, the regime ended the
feudal lord’s (Lehnsherr) “right” of succession by forcibly breaking-up all land, traditionally
held as fiefdoms, into several allodial plots that were now free to be alienated by their new
owners.132
While a number of reform-minded Hamburgers welcomed these “progressive” elements
of French rule, Napoleon recognized the continued resonance of traditional government
throughout occupied Europe. Yet, as Katherine Aaslestad argues, in the hopes of encouraging
allegiance to the Empire, the French sought to administer their territories through “efficient,
enlightened, and rational government.”133 French reform, however, was ultimately focused on
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the strengthening and centralizing of Imperial control, a fundamental aspect of which was
breaking the power of the Lutheran Church in Hamburg. As early as 1522, reformed teaching
had begun to sink roots into Hamburg’s parishes and by 1527, a permanent collegial body, the
Forty-Eight, gained the right to advise the Rat on all matters concerning the welfare of the city.
By the late eighteenth century, the Rat had come to rely on the city’s collegial bodies as
“collaborators and co-rulers over the vast majority of Hamburg’s inhabitants,” with certain
individuals simultaneously holding parish and government positions.134 The Imperial
administration, by eliminating the legal distinction between social classes, enfranchising
minority Calvinist, Catholic, and Jewish populations, and by secularizing fundamental aspects of
individuals’ public and private lives (birth, death, marriage, justice, and law enforcement),
defined a strict separation between church and state and drastically limited the role that unelected
officials could play in the world of city politics.

Repression, Violence, and the First Liberation of Hamburg

Yet, these progressive, secularizing reforms had little effect on the mentality of the
majority of Hamburg’s residents who were scornful of the Empire’s desire to “Frenchify” the
city.135 Imperial spectacle celebrating Napoleon’s birthday, the anniversaries of French victories,
and the birth of Napoleon’s son in March 1811, likewise did not generate popular support for the
regime, despite the fact that they were highly publicized, widely attended, and offered free
entertainment for the city’s lower classes.136 On 9 June 1811 the city celebrated the birth and

134

Lindemann, Patriots and Paupers, 16-7, 221 n.11.

135

Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Französenzeit, 38; Mönkeberg, Hamburg unter dem Drucke, 35; Schmidt,
Hamburg im Zeitalter, 506-7.
136

Ibid., 495-7; Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 251.

47

crowning of Napoleon’s son as the King of Rome. The event began with a special service for
civil and military authorities at St. Michael’s Church; all other churches in Hamburg were
required to open their doors and offer an identical service so that all residents might share in the
solemnity of the event. Throughout the city, a crown was added to the head of the Imperial
eagle, signifying the initiation of a Bonapartist dynasty and a new era of Imperial design
throughout Europe. That evening, a military procession moved slowly through Hamburg’s
streets, illuminated especially for the ceremony, to the Alster, where a giant blue flame was lit.137
Throughout the summer of 1811 and again in the years 1812 and 1813, the French repeatedly
turned Hamburg’s streets and public squares into stages for political theater.138 Not only were
dinners and masquerades held for Hamburg’s wealthy, but a series of fireworks displays,
lotteries, and free theatrical performances were held in the hopes of gaining support from all
strata of Hamburg’s population. Statues and busts of the Emperor, proposed in May 1811 and
unveiled in August of 1812, stamped French authority permanently throughout Hamburg’s urban
fabric while announcing the city’s inclusion within the Empire.139 But with a shattered economy
and new conscription obligations, an increase in the heavy-handedness of the French police and
custom agents turned a generally quiescent population hostile and, in some cases, even violent.140
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While the occupation had always relied on an intrusive, public police presence, French
authorities’ use of force had remained within accepted, regularized, and legitimate limits. Yet in
an environment of extreme economic dislocation, French force appeared to most Hamburgers as
disproportionate and arbitrary French violence.
Police surveillance of the press, which began in the earliest days of the occupation,
increased significantly after Hamburg’s incorporation into the Empire. All official
correspondence and public announcements were mandated by the Imperial regime to be printed
in both German and French no later than 1 July 1811.141 To ensure complete control of public
opinion, many of Hamburg’s most widely-read newspapers and journals were also forced to add
a French title and to publish articles with no overt political content. A review of four years’
worth of publications by three of Hamburg’s internationally recognized journals, the
Hamburgischer Correspondent (renamed the Journal de Départment des Bouches de L’Elbe);
the Orient, oder Hamburgisches Morgenblatt; and the Gemeinützige Nachrichten von und für
Hamburg (renamed Affiches, Annonces et Avis divers de Hambourg) offers little more than bland
local news, the availability of common goods, and international stories given pro-Imperial
interpretations.142 By late 1811, General Director of the Police, d’Aubignosc, had focused his
personal attention on the former Hamburgischer Correspondent, giving the paper a modicum of
independence in the hopes of preserving the paper’s continental credibility. It soon became clear
to Hamburg’s reading population, however, that the once-reputable Correspondent, along with
the rest of Hamburg’s “reformed press,” had ceased to be a medium for genuine news, earning it
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the popular moniker, the “paper of the beets” implying that Hamburgers were being fed news fit
for livestock (beets were raised to feed farm animals). Eventually, d’Aubignosc would make all
editorial decisions for the Correspondent himself, even dictating many articles personally.143 For
the French police, the seeking out of illegal publications, woodcuts, and pamphlets, and the
monitoring of content published in journals still active within Hamburg, remained a central
priority until the final month of the occupation.144
The regulation of the press, arbitrary searches of private property, and the continuation of
the Continental System, increasingly brought the French police to bear on individuals’ daily
lives. Relentless in their pursuit of contraband, the douaniers and the police, often arrogant and
cruel, intruded upon Hamburgers’ private lives to such an extent that, as one observer put it,
“Harsh regulations were enforced with heartless brutality. Ground down by the exactions of
greedy officials of every rank, and harassed by arbitrary persecution, the inhabitants of Hamburg
had not even the consolation of feeling themselves free from annoyance in their own homes.”145
It was also common knowledge throughout the city that d’Aubignosc relied on a web of paid
informants and had planted a number of spies in coffee houses, clubs, the Stock Exchange, and,
disguised as church figures, even among Hamburg’s most wealthy merchant families.146
Conscription and billeting obligations also increased throughout the end of 1811 and early 1812
as Napoleon prepared for his campaign against Russia. By 1812, the French had drafted 3,500
men into 127th Infantry Regiment, promising an immediate and harsh response to those who
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failed to report as well as sanctions against the families of soldiers who deserted.147 Service in
the Imperial armed forces fell most heavily on Hamburg’s poor as wealthy families could afford
to “purchase” substitutes. These policies further enraged a section of society whose numbers had
increased throughout the occupation. Likewise, billeting obligations cut along class lines as
Hamburg’s poor were forced to bear the cost of feeding and housing the 13,000 soldiers, 40
officers, and 3,000 military horses stationed inside the city walls, with thousands more in
Hamburg’s suburbs.148 The combined effect of increased police surveillance, arbitrary arrests,
and the inequality in billeting and conscription obligations, eventually drove Hamburg’s
underclass to challenge the regime both vocally and physically by early 1813, as news of Grand
Army’s debacle in Russia slowly began to trickle in.
While the French police had arrested a number of individuals publicly protesting
conscription and noted a general dissatisfaction with Imperial rule throughout Hamburg, the
mood of the city remained rather tranquil. Those examples of anti-Imperial agitation that
existed remained localized and small-scale allowing French police to maintain order without
relying on French soldiers.149 By late 1812, word of Napoleon’s evacuation of Moscow had
reached Hamburg and, in January 1813, the ragged remains of Napoleon’s army had reached
Hamburg’s gates with news of the events in Russia. By mid-February, growing rumors
regarding the approach of Russian Cossacks and the evacuation of French officials and their
wives and children led to increased tensions throughout the city. Well-connected members of
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Hamburg’s literary, political, and artisanal communities began stockpiling illegal weapons and
even planned to resurrect the city’s Civic Militia as an “alternative to French authority.”150 With
Russian troops only miles from the city, French police intensified their presence in the hopes of
preempting a popular uprising before it could start.151
Late on 23 February, in front of a starving crowd and only minutes before the gate was to
close, French police arrested a number of smugglers at Millerntor.152 The following morning,
popular unrest spread rapidly throughout the city as crowds of women, children, unemployed
workers, and deserting conscripts, burned and looted customs and watch houses, stoned despised
French customs officials (before throwing them into the canals), destroyed Imperial symbols, and
burned the Police Commissioner’s home to the ground. While violent, these events were not the
product of mindless mob revolt. These actions fall squarely into the tradition of popular justice
and public shaming which had help to govern both urban and rural communities since at least the
eleventh century. The targets were symbolic, and the harm done was aimed at ending dignity
rather than life.153 Nevertheless, French police were caught off-guard and opened fire on the
crowd, killing several and wounding a number of others.154 The revolt was suppressed later that
afternoon when French General Carra St. Cyr called on Danish troops from Altona and reinstated
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Hamburg’s Civic Militia to help maintain order throughout the city.155 And while the
pacification of the remaining crowd proceeded peacefully, as neither the Danes nor the Civic
Militia were considered potential targets or threats by the protesters, the damage to French
authority was irrevocable.
Following the events of 23 February, the French countered with heavy-handed police
action that further eroded their authority and intensified what Hamburg’s residents perceived as
slide from an acceptable use of force to state-sponsored violence. Days after the revolt, those
French authorities that remained in Hamburg began carrying weapons in public and, over the
course of the next two weeks, shot and killed a number of Hamburg’s residents. Strict
regulations against public gatherings were enacted as the French forced coffee houses and
taverns to close in the early evenings.156 General St. Cyr also repositioned four of Hamburg’s
cannons as a warning against future insurrection.157 Military courts were hastily convened on 27
February and 3 March trying and executing individuals (on the same day) suspected of spying
for Russia.158 A number of other Hamburgers were shot and killed in the next two months.
None of these deaths caused more outrage, however, than the death of a poor deaf carpenter shot
on his way home from work, by a French soldier. In the wake of such unprecedented violence,
Hamburg’s upper-class citizens, who had supported the Imperial regime in the hopes of
mitigating the destruction of private property, now viewed the French as being responsible for
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the increase in unrest throughout the city. On 4 March, Mayor Abendroth wrote to General St.
Cyr with the disturbing news that peace could no longer be guaranteed and that popular agitation
against French rule could no longer be contained.159 The Imperial regime’s attempt to forestall
popular revolt through harsh measures had backfired, radicalizing Hamburg’s poor and,
eventually, alienating the city’s wealthy inhabitants. The French use of force in the defense of
law, order, and security increasingly appeared to all segments of society as indiscriminate,
lawless, and disruptive violence.
On 7 March, the full-scale evacuation of French administrators and civilians began as the
arrival of Russian Cossacks appeared inevitable. Five days later, on 12 March, General St. Cyr
ordered the withdrawal of all French military personnel. Expecting French reinforcements to
reengage with the Russians, St Cyr issued the city a prophetic warning: “Goodbye for two
months.”160 Even so, the Imperial administration remained intact, as Hamburg’s Mayor
Abendroth continued to communicate with Paris and implored Hamburg’s residents to maintain
order and security.161 As Aaslestad argues, a number of local authorities in Hamburg were
“reluctant” to “assert themselves,” as they were skeptical of Russia’s ability to defend the city
from the return of the Imperial Army and were concerned with the reprisals they would face if
the city were retaken.162 Yet, assured by the presence of Russian soldiers, a rump Senate
convened on 17 March and declared Hamburg’s independence. The following afternoon,
Colonel Friedrich Karl von Tettenborn and his Russian troops paraded throughout the city, where
they were hailed as liberators and saviors.
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Chapter 2
Society and Politics in Restoration-Era Hamburg:
Militarization, Police Repression, and the Rise of
Economic Liberalism, 1813-1830
Those who were on hand to witness Tettenborn and his 1400 Cossacks march into
Hamburg on 18 March 1813 remembered the event as one of the most festive days the city had
ever experienced.163 Marching through Hamburg’s southeast gate at Steintor, the Cossacks were
received as liberators by thousands of overwhelmed Hamburgers who had decorated city streets
and market places with the colors of the city. The Cossacks, who had adorned their horses with
French pistols, sabers, and uniforms, and hung watches and Legion of Honor medals from their
immense beards, were showered with white flowers as they continued their northwest march
throughout the city.164 The crowds offered their liberators cake, cheese, meat, wine, brandy, and
beer; busts and statues of Tsar Alexander lined the streets as cheers of “Long live Tsar
Alexander!” could be heard throughout the evening. As night fell, candles were lit and placed in
every window to mark the solemnity of the event.165 Later that evening, Tettenborn proclaimed
Hamburg’s independence and announced the re-instatement of the city’s Senate so that “anarchy
and unrest” could be avoided.166
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More importantly, however, Hamburgers understood the event as marking a return of the
republic’s “ancient rights” and independent status.167 Similar to other regions throughout Central
Europe, Hamburg’s population experienced their struggle throughout 1813 as anti-French,
celebrating the end of taxation, billeting, and the financial exploitation of the city.168 And while
the restoration of Hamburg’s economic prosperity was immediately fixed upon by the press as
central to the revival of the city’s livelihood,169 close attention to publicized debates as well as
the string of new ordinances suggest a post-occupation Senate aware of its precarious political
situation. It is true that the Senate’s return, and with it an ante-bellum constitution, resonated
with a beleaguered population, wary of any reform that smacked of French influence. 170 Yet
many Hamburgers considered the reinstated Senate as rather undistinguished, while others
derided it for its treachery in negotiating with the French army, who would eventually return
three months later. While the Senate formed under Russian occupation immediately folded after
Imperial forces re-occupied the city in May 1813, the establishment of an armed militia in the
preceding months, and the triumphant return of the militia in 1814, is a crucial factor in
understanding how the Senate was able to reestablish its legitimacy and the city’s sovereignty in
April 1814. Positioning themselves as the only party able to provide order and security, the
Senate immediately claimed victory over the French and proclaimed the restoration of the
republic’s independence. Recognizing that its authority was secure and that its interests lay in
167
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the promotion of free trade, the Senate distanced itself from the same militias that provided this
post-war stability, relying solely on its French-inspired policing agencies to maintain order and
security throughout the city so that trade could once again flourish.
The government that emerged after the so-called Wars of Liberation against French
oppression had fundamentally redefined its relationship to its subject population. As the Senate
began to sift through the republic’s 1712 constitution as well as all French reform, to “examine
everything and keep the best,”171 the ensuing public debates, and a series of new proclamations
and police ordinances, show a government increasingly adhering to a socially noninterventionist
agenda. This new post-war, laissez-faire atmosphere was at odds with Hamburg’s traditional
sense of civic activism, and relied on the Senate and its police force’s ability to identify and
prosecute new classes of social undesirables. And while the city had always had its share of
working poor, orphaned children, as well as a migrant population, the emerging post-1815
government was no longer centered on poor relief, but instead focused entirely on the defense of
its liberal economic policies and the livelihood of the city’s elite minority. Peace, order, and
prosperity in nineteenth-century Hamburg came at the expense of the city’s increasingly policed
and economically marginalized majority.

Patriotism and Defense during the Russian Period
In March 1813, with the return of Imperial forces likely, Hamburg’s Senate welcomed
the Russians not only as heroes but as defenders of the city. Within the first days of the so-called
“Russian Period,” Tettenborn, along with the Senate, called upon Hamburg’s citizens to enlist in
a defensive regional militia to protect their cities and to join other northern Germans in the
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continuing fight against Napoleon. In an open proclamation to the city on 19 March, “Zu den
Waffen für Vaterland und Recht!,” Tettenborn touched on the more broad German struggle
against French “tyranny,” while specifically addressing Hamburgers’ need to fight in order to
defend their city.172 The city’s response to the creation of a Hanseatic Legion was
overwhelming, with over fourteen hundred infantry volunteers and two hundred cavalry
volunteers signing up within the first two days. Also, it was announced that a Citizens Militia
(Bürgergarde) was to be re-instated, a move that was also met with marked enthusiasm.173 By
the following week, Hamburg’s once-empty streets were occupied by raw recruits drilling with
arms supplied to them by Britain, whose ships lined the harbor almost immediately following the
French evacuation.174 As Katherine Aaslestad argues, the establishment of the Hanseatic Legion
as well as the Citizen’s Militia marked a clear watershed in the history of Hamburg’s sense of
“patriotism and civic allegiance.”175 However demonstrable that may be, the popular enthusiasm
of March and April soon gave way to a general sense of despair as the logistics of defending the
city against the French appeared increasingly difficult to manage. The Senate itself proved
utterly incapable of managing the military crisis and, according to many Hamburgers, cravenly
began secret negotiations for the surrender of the city weeks before the French actually arrived.
And while Hamburg’s so-called “Russian period” was an abject financial and political disaster,
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ending with a second, and far more brutal, occupation by the French military, the creation of
armed militias in March and April suggests that the returning Senate clearly understood the
importance of maintaining a legitimate armed policing force.
As noted by Englishman Robert Semple, the Hanseatic Legion, impressed by Russian
military strength, styled their new uniforms in a similar Russian fashion.176 The uniforms
consisted of a buttonless, knee-length coat of a deep green with a pale blue collar and similar
deep green trousers.177 A green cockade was added to each soldier’s cap, helping to establish a
sense of regional solidarity and territorial allegiance, while simultaneously increasing awareness
of specific identities and loyalties. These so-called “national cockades” also fulfilled a purely
functional need throughout the allied armies by identifying friend from foe on the battle field.178
The flag of the Hanseatic Legion incorporated the colors of the Hanseatic cities’ arms, red and
white, and consisted of a red Maltese cross on a white field that appeared on uniforms and flags
as well as medals. The Legion’s battle standard also included the inscription “Gott mit Uns” in
gothic script written above the Hanseatic Cross on one side and, on the other side, the combined
arms of Bremen, Lübeck, and Hamburg.179 A number of similar slogans, such as “A Strong
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Fig. 7. Handbill for the Hanseatic Legion, 1813.

61

Protector is our God,” or “We are United in a Sacred Bond,” accompanied the general design.
These sentiments can also be found in a series of speeches, plays, and emotional lyrics published
in March, 1813, that point to the overt religious nature of the Wars of Liberation.180
Designed to protect Hamburg itself, as well as the suburbs and the Elbe islands just south
of the city, a Citizens Militia (Bürgergarde) was created to enlist male volunteers from all social
classes between the ages of 18 and 45. Organized into eight battalions, six of which were from
the inner city and two from the suburbs of St. Georg and Hamburger Berg (now St. Pauli),
including a company of artillery and a small cavalry, the militia’s primary function was
maintaining peace and order in the city.181 Publicist and doctor Jonas Ludwig von Heß, the
militia’s commander and former officer in the Swedish military, was joined by Gerhard Beneke
and Friedrich Perthes as majors with David Mettlerkamp and Karl Sieveking as battalion
commanders.182 All 6,000 volunteers, who were to be outfitted by the Senate with gunpowder,
cannons, and sabers, initially received little attention from Tettenborn as it became clear that it
would be impossible to supply the Citizens Militia adequately with British muskets. Despite the
initial enthusiasm, it was apparent to Hamburg’s Senate that not all the city’s inhabitants were
making the appropriate sacrifices for the city’s defense. In late March, the Senate publicly
chastised those who shirked or abused night-watch duties, stressing their importance for peace
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and order.183 By May, the Senate was forced to remind Hamburgers that all men between the
ages 18 and 45 were required not only to join the Militia but, more importantly, were obliged to
attend now mandatory drills as well as night patrols. Those who would neglect this duty were
threatened by the Senate with heavy fines and public shaming.184
Throughout April and May, 1813, the Senate focused almost exclusively on the defense
of the city, urging women and men to join the struggle for freedom as both “Hanseatics and
Patriots.”185 Hamburg’s press, now freed from French censorship and reemerging in late March
publishing exclusively in German, likewise pursued a similar, “patriotic,” agenda by imploring
their compatriots to sacrifice time, money, their children, and their comfort in the ongoing battle
against Napoleon. 186 As Aaslestad has argued, the war against Napoleon was not fought with
bullets alone. A newly liberated press that sought to politicize and popularize the struggle
through emotional lyrics, poetry, as well as a series of other publications such as a field
newspaper (Feldzeitung), was crucial in organizing whole populations to fight against the
French.187 By May, eight new papers were reporting on German military preparations, field
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movements, as well as the “foul crimes of the French.”188 While Tettenborn welcomed the press
as a useful tool in the rallying of the city’s spirit, the Senate, worried about the potential disorder
caused by large crowds surrounding journal and pamphlet vendors, placed restrictions on
“unqualified” and “unregistered” publicists and threatened imprisonment, fines, and public
“embarrassment” to those caught printing offensive material.189
The press not only played a role in publicizing the anti-Napoleonic struggle, organizing
the city’s campaign to collect money and materials, it also functioned by articulating distinctly
gendered styles of participation and patriotic commitment. While men were called to take up
arms in defense of Hamburg’s independence, women were implored to “renounce fashion by
sacrificing their pleasures, jewels, and belongings to contribute to the liberation of their beloved
Vaterstadt.”190 Women’s societies, such as the Hamburger Frauenverein founded by Elisabeth
von Struve and Philippine Kleudgen at the Church of St. Katherine, immediately set to work
sewing shirts and knitting socks for the Hanseatic Legion.191 Such organizations allowed women
to express solidarity with the soldiers by sewing uniforms and flags, raising money, as well as
through medical care and hospital support.192 As skirmishes between regional militias and
Imperial forces erupted throughout northern Germany, women soon became the sole caretakers
of all victims of warfare (civilians as well as soldiers). Through this work, some women,
especially those from propertied backgrounds, moved into acceptable, publicly-recognized
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positions. While most women’s participation followed traditional gendered norms, a few women
defied those roles, such as Anna Lühring from Bremen, who at 17 disguised herself in her older
brother’s clothing and fought with the Lützowsche Freikorps, earning public recognition as a
patriot and war hero.193
Regardless of the early enthusiasm and public presentations of solidarity with Hamburg’s
armed forces, it was painfully clear by May that the city was unprepared to defend itself against
what was now considered to be the imminent return of Imperial soldiers. Woefully undertrained
and inadequately provisioned, most of Hamburg’s recruits spent more time drilling in public than
learning how to handle a firearm; many would eventually face the French military without
having ever held a weapon.194 It was also noted that many of the Citizen Militia’s captains spent
more time writing and theorizing about the positive effects of regular drilling on a man’s
constitution that few found the time to actually do so.195 Tales of inefficiency, abuse, and
neglect at the hands of the city’s military authorities ultimately led to a major military crisis in
mid-May as entire battalions evaporated along with the pool of new recruits.196 By 20 May, von
Heß, the Citizens Militia’s commander, had lost control over the Citizens Militia, the city’s last
line of defense. Resistance against the French military came in the form of acts of bravery by
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individual Hamburgers who prepared themselves to fight with lances, scythes, spears, butchers’
knives, and even the old executioner’s sword.197
Contributing to the city’s increasing sense of despair was the disenchantment with their
Russian occupiers. Once hailed as heroes and saviors of the city, Tettenborn and the Russians
insinuated themselves within Hamburg’s Senate and lived quite comfortably at the expense of
the population.198 Not only did Tettenborn demand 10,000 louis d’ors for his troubles, he
personally confiscated all the property left behind by the retreating French.199 The Senate
eventually paid half of Tettenborn’s demanded recompense but made him an honorary citizen in
the hopes of tempering his disappointment. Accounts from the period touch not only on
Tettenborn’s greed, but on his military incompetence as well as his time spent throwing lavish
parties, rather than preparing the city’s defenses.200 In one instance, Tettenborn publicly
threatened to exile former mayor Abendroth to Siberia after Abendroth spoke out about such
costly extortions.201 After the first week, the free gifts of food and drink offered to the Cossacks
turned into billeting obligations by the Russian military. 202 As one contemporary Hamburger
complained, Russian soldiers incurred the ire of the population as they smoked pipes and played
cards in the streets while demanding three warm meals, black coffee, and a daily ration of dark
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rum.203 Arriving in Hamburg with only the goods they could carry, the Russian military
evacuated the city with a train consisting of over ninety packed wagons. “We never had a
French general,” one Hamburger claimed, “that was as expensive to keep up as this Russian.”204
To make matters worse, Hamburg’s Senate, fearful of potential reprisals from both the
French as well as the Russians, wavered in the defense of the city as Napoleon’s reorganized
Grand Army resumed its offensive in late April. By 29 April, French forces under the command
of General Dominique- Joseph René Vandamme, Count of Unseburg, had successfully captured
Harburg, a city lying three miles south of Hamburg. Legionnaires spent the first week of May
fighting a series of skirmishes with the French advance guards over the Elbe Islands, and
particularly the city of Wilhelmsburg that lay less than two miles directly south of the city
center.205 Tettenborn, attempting to ward off the threat of a siege and prolonged bombardment,
went on the offensive on 12 May. By the end of the first afternoon, over 1,000 Hanseatic
Legionnaires had lost their lives in Tettenborn’s bid to save the city. By 13 May, not only had
Wihlemsburg been lost, but with it, the town of Veddel, a city southeast of Hamburg. Witnesses
to the debacle describe poorly trained militia men firing on each other and their allies in the
confusion, and entire battalions of Legionnaires abandoning strategic positions to the battlehardened French army without firing a single shot.206 Any hopes that the Senate had in
defending the city were lost.
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Failing either to defend Hamburg adequately or to surrender it peacefully, the Senate
began secret negotiations with Marshall Davout in Altona, attempting to mitigate French
reprisals against the government. The Senate’s representatives hoped to persuade the French that
they had been forcefully occupied and militarized by the Russians against their will.207
Following the second French evacuation in 1814, Hamburg’s publicists recognized the Senate’s
selfish and indecisive actions and publicly criticized the government for its failure to defend the
republic.208 Referred to as the “war of the pens,” this emotional and public outcry against the
Senate in 1814 focused not only on the government’s cowardice in 1813, but also on its
subsequent lack of legitimacy after its second and final return. However publicly derided it was
and regardless of how poorly it had handled city affairs during the Russian occupation, the
Senate was able to harness a general anti-French sentiment while positioning itself as the
defender of law and order. While both the Hanseatic Legion as well as the Citizens Militia
proved utterly incapable of defending the city, a precedent had been set. As a product of
Hamburg’s first post-liberation Senate, the militia’s triumphant return in 1814 (after the final
evacuation of the French) allowed an unpopular government to claim victory and establish a
visible presence throughout the war-ravaged city.

Reoccupation and the Increased Militarization of Politics

As Tettenborn and the Senate had feared, the French laid siege to the city and began a
series of heavy bombardments on 19 and 20 May. The city was defended by 1200 of the original
6000 members of the Citizens Militia as well as a number of brave citizens who initially offered
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their lives in the defense of Hamburg’s independence. Respectable citizens sent what belongings
they could to their neighbors in Altona while sending their wives and children to the countryside.
Yet most citizens of means fled entirely, leaving the city populated by its defenders and the tens
of thousands of Hamburg’s lower classes who had no other option but to weather another
occupation. Aid in the defense of the city was promised by the Russians, the Danes, the British,
and finally the Swedes, although each country eventually recognized Hamburg’s desperate
situation and withdrew its support, leaving the city to its fate. 209 After 21 May, as the city’s
“spirit of resistance” had been broken by French cannons, officers of the Citizen’s Militia
deserted en masse.210 On 29 and 30 May, Tettenborn and the Russians evacuated Hamburg,
along with soldiers of the Hanseatic Legion. The Senate briefly adjourned and chose to flee the
city, investing a rump Senate with authority to negotiate with the French and manage escalating
public pandemonium. To those left within Hamburg, the city and its population had been
forsaken; women cried and screamed in disbelief in city streets that were littered with rubble
from destroyed homes, businesses, smashed muskets, broken sabers, and cartridge pouches.211
On the evening of 30 May, Danish and French detachments entered a sullen, “deathly still” city
where they would remain for an entire year. 212
The second occupation would be remembered as being far more exacting and harsh than
the seven years from 1806 to 1813. Napoleon wished for Hamburg to be made an example of for
those territories that would openly defy his designs for Europe. As such, he instructed Marshal

209

Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 296.

210

Rist, Johann Georg Rist in Hamburg, 256-280; Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit, 76-8;
Henke, Davout und die Festung Hamburg, 16; Carl Henke “Hamburg in den Kriegsereignissen 1813 und 1814”
Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte 28 (1914):
211

Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 297.

212

Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit, 81-2.

69

Davout to execute five leading Senators of the so-called “Cossack Senate” and to have the rest
removed from the city and placed in French prisons. Those who defended the city or were
captured during the weeks leading up to Hamburg’s surrender were to be placed on French
galleys and their officers summarily shot. While no one was executed and only twenty-eight
citizens (who had fled the city weeks earlier) were officially banished, the city was forced to
suffer financially. Recognizing Hamburg’s inhabitants as overwhelmingly merchant based, and,
according to Napoleon, concerned only with their own self-interest, the city was forced to pay
over 48 million francs for its liberation in March.213 In addition to the crippling financial
burdens, Hamburg’s inhabitants would also be subject to martial law.
The French administration would once again rely on public presentations of authority
which entailed a steady militarization of politics that would ultimately affect the nature of postwar political culture in Hamburg. On 1 June, thirty-five battalions of French and Dutch soldiers,
led by Davout and Division General Vandamme ceremoniously marched into Hamburg and
announced the official return of Imperial rule.214 French authorities wasted little time in
resurrecting the legal system that had governed Hamburg from 1811 to 1813. In a proclamation
dated 26 May, Davout outlined French control over Hamburg’s finances and reinstated the civil
and criminal justice system put in place by the Imperial regime in northern Germany in January
1811.215 All rights and “legal dispositions” of Hamburg’s citizens would once again be protected
under the constitution of 28 Flòreal XII (18 May 1804) while sharp distinctions were made
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between secular and religious duty and authority.216 All appointments to positions within the
court system would likewise conform to the constitution and would limit the role religious
authorities could play in the world of Hamburg’s politics.217 And finally, Davout’s proclamation
established the authority of the French police under the control of General Director d’Aubignosc.
Davout promised discipline and behavior “befitting of French professionalism,” established a
military court under his control, and instituted nightly patrols to ensure his instructions were
followed.218
Before the French entered the city, d’Aubignosc reestablished tight control over
Hamburg’s press, requiring all publicists to register with the department of police, and
threatening heavy fines for the printing of unregistered pamphlets and for the possession of
foreign newspapers.219 In addition, d’Aubignosc reinstated the ban on the housing of foreigners
and gave innkeepers and landlords twenty-four hours to obtain special permits allowing them to
rent rooms.220 Restrictions on large assemblies were put in place throughout the following
months, allowing only those individuals with written permission to attend theater performances,
balls, and even church. Individuals were banned from congregating in private houses and all
clubs, associations, and “companies” were outlawed entirely. Restrictions on occupancy in
216
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taverns, coffee houses, and guest houses eventually limited the number of patrons to six
customers in the morning and eight in the evening. Anyone “caught in the act” was to be
immediately arrested and removed from the city; those attempting to return were to be executed
as spies.221
No later than 15 June, the French administration in Hamburg could rely on both its police
force and National Guard units to maintain order throughout the city. 222 As Howard Brown has
argued, by the late 1790s the French army increasingly helped supplement regular forms of
government throughout the provinces. This, he contends, would lead to a steady militarization of
politics as well as everyday life throughout the French First Republic.223 The increased use of
armed force in the establishment of law and order that Brown traces holds true for the French
administration in Hamburg after 1813. While the army has been considered the sin qua non of
Directory-era and Napoleonic France, virtually no attention has been paid to the role the French
army played in the establishment of Imperial administrations in northern Germany. In the case
of occupied Hamburg, then, the French army not only offered expedited justice for what were
considered “political crimes,” but it gave courage to weak administrators and acted as the public
representation of Imperial authority.224
In addition to the reestablishment of the Civil and Criminal court system, the French
immediately began making arrangements for the creation of a “Cour Spéciale” to be staffed by
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four judges and three military personal.225 Herr Schlechendal, a German, was appointed as the
court’s acting president, with three Germans, Dr. Hesling, Dr. Boelling, Dr. Jelting, and one
Frenchmen, Mon. Greffier, appointed as the court’s four judges. Little is known about each of
these men other than that they were recommended by Eichhorn himself and all had legal
backgrounds.226 Also appointed to the court were three French officers: Captain d’Anvers,
commander of the gendarmerie in Hamburg; Captain Bagelaar, captain of the 33rd Regiment and
commander of recruitment throughout northern Germany (Department l’Ems Oriental); and
Captain Danneron, captain of the 125th Regiment of the Line. In accordance with the
Constitution of 28 Flòreal XII, each individual was publicly sworn into office on 15 July, 1813,
an event that took place at the Hôtel de Mairie, the retitled Goertz Palace and former site of the
Holy Roman Empire’s administration in Hamburg. What little documentation survives suggests
that the court was active throughout the thirty-second Military District (of which Hamburg was
the capital) and was reserved for crimes of a “political” nature. This would include recalcitrant
mayors or entire city councils, publicists of anti-Imperial literature, and those caught directly
“aiding” France’s enemies or “advancing the interests” of the countries with which France was at
war. Because military justice was designed to be swift and extra-legal, and because the War of
the Sixth Coalition was well under way, trial and sentence records are virtually non-existent.
The sheer amount of correspondence between the court’s president and the Minster of Justice in
Paris, Mathieu Louis Molé, suggests that the court was somewhat overwhelmed in the month and
a half before the Battle of Leipzig.227
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As the holding of Hamburg became central to Imperial designs in northern Germany,
Napoleon issued Davout orders to begin the fortification of the city and its surrounding suburbs.
Thousands of Hamburg’s remaining residents were recruited for the rebuilding of the city’s old
ramparts and crumbling city walls while others were forced to construct a bridge connecting the
city with the town of Harburg across the Elbe. Sections of Hamburg’s inner wall, which ringed
the entire city, had long ago become elegant, tree-lined promenades populated by street vendors
and musicians. Within twenty-four hours of his arrival, Davout his officers to marshal ten
thousand Hamburgers to begin the refortification of the city. This entailed repairs to the walls,
key defensive fortifications outside the city gates, and the building of a citadel in Harburg able to
quarter four to five thousand men who would police the towns south of Hamburg and engage, if
necessary, with enemy forces.228 Davout also ordered the leveling of all the towns, churches,
gardens, and farms outside the city walls and had the suburbs of Hamm and Hamburger Berg
burned to the ground to clear fields of fire for French artillery.229 Private residences, empty
warehouses, and other public buildings, including the Stock Exchange and four of Hamburg’s
churches, were requisitioned and converted into barracks, hospitals, and horse stables.230
The building of the Hamburg-Harburg bridge was equally taxing on Hamburg’s
inhabitants. The bridge, whose construction was headed by Christian Friedrich Lange, the Chef
supérieur des ateliers des ponts et chaussées, was to link the two cities that were separated by a
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Fig. 8. Christoph Suhr, Hamburg-Harburg Bridge completed in 1813. Here, French cavalry enter
Harburg.

Fig. 9. Christopher Suhr, Hamburg-Harburg Bridge with Hamburg in the background, 1815.
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series of swampy islands that dotted the Elbe. Davout ordered the bridge be wide enough so that
an army of 30,000-40,000, marching five abreast, could traverse it in under twenty-four hours.231
Begun on 5 June, the 15,173 foot long bridge eventually took 3798 Hamburgers, 1800 French
soldiers, and sixty horses eighty three days to complete.232 The day after its completion, a
division of French cavalry in full parade uniform, ceremoniously crossed the bridge into Harburg
where they remained stationed until France’s final retreat in May 1814. The two cities had
effectively become a double fortress, with a series of smaller redoubts guarding the western and
eastern march to the city. Both Davout and Napoleon felt a protracted siege and battle for the
city was imminent. And while that great battle never materialized, the fortification of Hamburg
not only wrought untold misery on the population but effectively changed the face of the city
with astounding speed and exclusively with military concerns in mind.233
In preparation for what Napoleon was certain to be a protracted siege, he ordered all
Hamburg’s remaining inhabitants to provision their homes with food and fuel to last six months.
Hamburgers, who were living week to week, found it impossible to adequately provision
themselves, especially the city’s poor.234 Saddled with the cost of quartering French soldiers and
with the building of new homes for French officers, Hamburgers were also forced to supply their
occupiers with wine, meat, tools, wagons, and horses. Not only were public buildings
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requisitioned as hospitals, but the city’s population was forced to build new facilities at their own
expense. It was estimated that in June alone Hamburgers had contributed eight million francs to
the French war effort. In July, oil from the streetlamps was requisitioned, leaving city streets in
total darkness at night; streets increasingly fouled by waste and excrement which made some
sections of the city uninhabitable.235 In June and July, Davout ordered prisoners to be transferred
to Lübeck (most of whom escaped en route) and orphaned children to Eppendorf. By December,
the French were systematically expelling all foreign-born inhabitants, vagrants, and the insane
(released when administrators requisitioned their hospital) from the city. On Christmas Eve,
1813, French soldiers drove 20,000-25,000 of the city’s poorest and weakest citizens out of the
city into the freezing winter evening without any provisions. While many made it to Altona and
Bremen, where Assistance Societies, created by exiles from Hamburg, were able to feed them,
1,138 never made it and are buried in a mass grave in the town of Ottensen, outside of Altona.236
Beyond their policing and juridical functions, the French military participated in
moments of Imperial spectacle as both a representation of authority and as a focal point of
French prestige. Announced to the city on 7 August 1813, by temporary mayor Georg Rüder,
the city would be hosting a celebration in honor of Napoleon’s birthday on 15 August. Parade
routes were outlined and provisions were made for the cleaning of the streets and public squares
in which the celebration would take place. The day was to begin with a burst of cannon fire
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followed by the ringing of bells and the offering of a Te Deum at every church in Hamburg.237
At noon, thirty battalions of French soldiers, led by Davout and Vandamme, marched through
the city, along the bastions, ending on the Alster with a speech that freely associated the vitality
of the Empire with the lives of its “guarantors” and “defenders.”238 While dinner was made
available to four thousand of the city’s poorest residents and tickets to free entertainment were
distributed, the entire event was clearly meant as both a display of military might and a display
of Imperial authority. In fact, similar events, such as celebrations of military victories and
funerals for fallen heroes, drew similar parallels between the control of armed force and modern
political authority and legitimacy.239
This, then, is a crucial legacy of French occupation in Hamburg, as well as for most of
Europe in the nineteenth century. The enhanced repressive character of the justice system, the
monopolization and display of armed force as the basis of legitimacy, and the further
professionalization of policing forces increasingly responsive to state demand, are all products of
Imperial rule. Updating Carl Schmitt, Howard Brown has argued that the increased and focused
use of force in defense of liberal constitutional aims has become one of the defining features of
European liberal democracies. Brown contends that neither totalitarianism nor democratic
republicanism was the most important outcome of the French Revolution or of the Empire.
Rather, it was a “Faustian pact” citizens made with the “instruments of repression” that
destroyed the foundations of an organic society and enabled the emergence of the modern
security state, where legitimacy was derived from the restoring and preserving of order.240 And
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Fig. 10. Jeß Bundsen, The Ruins of Hamburger Berg (St. Pauli), 1814.
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while the post-Napoleonic Hamburg Senate did not maintain a significant amount of French
reform, it did, recognize the uses of a substantially more modern approach to the establishment
and defense of its legitimacy and authority.
The End of French Rule and the Return of the Citizen’s Militia

After the complete breakdown of military authority in Hamburg during the French advance
in May 1813, David Mettlerkamp organized those still willing to fight in Mecklenburg. There,
with the aid of exiled men from Lübeck, he established the Hanseatic Citizens Militia, initially
comprised of some 380 men, with the goal of re-liberating their home cities.241 Pledging an oath
to the Hanseatic Federation, Mettlerkamp and his men refused to join the Hanseatic Legion or
accept foreign payment in the hopes of maintaining their independence.242 The ranks of the
Hanseatic Citizen’s Militia soon swelled as more exiles joined, especially after October 1813 and
Napoleon’s retreat back into France. However, Hamburg would remain garrisoned by French
troops until late May, 1814, one month after the Treaty of Fontainebleau exiled Napoleon to the
Island of Elba.243 Exiled Hamburgers met between August and November 1813 to devise plans
for Hamburg’s post-war independence as well as the establishment of an interim government.
By January, soldiers of the Hanseatic Legion and Citizen’s Militia were actively harassing
French detachments south of Hamburg. In late April, the French finally sued for peace and
began their final evacuation in mid-May, allowing Allied troops as well as the Hanseatic
Citizen’s Militia to reenter the city as liberators on 31 May. And while the Hanseatic Citizen’s
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Militia would be disbanded in late September, its presence was crucial for the discredited Senate
to establish order and security, and in so doing, its own legitimacy.
Self-described Patriots, those members of Hamburg’s Senate exiled from the city during
the second French occupation, began meeting between August and November, 1813, to establish
the Hanseatic Directory, the body through which Hanseatic military and foreign policy would be
articulated. Men such as Friedrich Perthes, Beneke, and Mettlerkamp, meeting in the towns of
Rostock and Wismar, and in the camp of the Swedish army, implored fellow exiles to support the
Hanseatic Legion and Hanseatic Citizens Militia. In a series of broadsheets, they publicized the
goals of the Directory, calling all Hanseatics and Germans alike to support the armed struggle
against France, offering aid to all Hanseatic exiles, and even proposing to enter into negotiations
with the Great Powers to ensure post-war independence.244 Official recognition of the Directory
as the representative of Hanseatic interest was eventually secured, but only after slow and
tedious negotiation. Many of the younger representatives, such as Perthes and Beneke, proposed
a series of legal and constitutional reforms designed to democratize Hamburg’s 1712
constitution.245 Allied support for the Patriots’ reforms, however, was not forthcoming as
commanders and statesmen would not tolerate “internal strife” and extended their assistance only
in the reestablishment of traditional government.246 Yet the Directory was able to secure the
Hanseatic cities’ independence while at Allied headquarters in Frankfurt and eventually thwarted
Prussian expansion westward at the Congress of Vienna. In 1814, and again in 1815, the Great
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Powers formally announced the continued independence of the three cities.247 The Senate’s ties
to the popular Citizens Militia, and vice-versa, would come to serve it well in the period
following its return, allowing an undistinguished government to position itself not only as the
legitimate heir of the struggle against Napoleon but also as the defender of peace and security.
The final battle for Hamburg would begin on 4 January 1814, with a siege of the city that
introduced unprecedented levels of suffering among both citizens and occupiers alike. By the
end of the month, shortages of food led to desertion throughout the ranks of the Imperial army
and brought with it waves of typhus that took a ghastly toll on French soldiers. 248 More homes
were requisitioned as hospitals for ill soldiers, while belongings such as mattresses, bedding, and
clothing were increasingly demanded by the military. Hamburg’s doctors and surgeons were
instructed to report to military hospitals or face imprisonment. It was estimated that in February
and March somewhere between 60 to 100 soldiers died daily: 11,000 in total, all buried in a mass
grave in St. Georg, dug by the same French soldiers who would eventually share it. French
officers, however, still managed to live in relative comfort. Stories of expensive balls thrown by
administrators abound, with one contemporary noting (with a mix of horror and delight) a French
officer who escorted his daughter through a maze of some fifty dead horses into a lively
soirée.249
Throughout January and February, the Hanseatic Legion was engaging in a series of
small skirmishes with Davout’s forces south of Hamburg, while the Hanseatic Citizens Militia
began an assault on the city of Harburg. By March, both Hamburg and Harburg were under
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siege by Russian soldiers as well as the Hanseatic Citizens Militia whose ranks were increasing
daily as exiles returned home.250 In late May, as the Hanseatic Citizens Militia’s numbers had
reached its peak, the French surrendered the city of Hamburg, all without the great battle that
Napoleon and Davout had anticipated. Yet the French maintained a presence in the city, under
the flag of the Bourbons, a month after Napoleon was exiled to Elba. 251 Davout obtained
honorable terms with Allied officers for the evacuation of his men and marched what remained
of the French garrison out of Hamburg on the morning of 26 May.252 Those French soldiers who
remained in Hamburg’s hospitals, some five thousand, would eventually fall victim to ridicule
that often escalated into violence. Popular anti-French sentiment was the direct cause of at least
two acts of brutal mob violence, one of which included the harassing and beating of visibly ill
convalescents, most under the age of 16. The other, somewhat less serious case, involved a
detachment of soldiers who were attacked and forced to denounce France publicly. In his
correspondence, Georg Parish claimed the violence was due to the final year of French
occupation: “The French Nation have to thank the atrocity of Davoust [sic.] for the cruelty which
an exasperated people may exercise toward their unfortunate countrymen.”253
The first proclamations from Hamburg’s reestablished Senate came as French soldiers
were hurriedly packing what documents and belongings they could carry. The Senate appealed
to Hamburger’s desire for order and security, and claimed it was every citizen’s “duty” to once
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again allow the “rudder of government” to be transferred “safely into their hands.”254 Grounding
their legitimacy in the defense of order, the Senate followed with a proclamation that established
a police department whose authority was effective immediately.255 The creation of a single
policing institution, based on the previous French model, required that traditional bodies of
authority, such as the harbor and shipping authorities (Hafen- und Schiffahrtsdeputation), or the
street and building authorities (Gassen- und Baudeputation), be merged into a concentrated
department under the control of the city’s Senate.256 This marks the establishment of the first
professional police force consisting solely of Germans in Hamburg’s history. And while the
police department would undergo structural changes throughout the nineteenth century,
enlarging its purview and streamlining its bureaucracy, the basic formula of a more modern,
armed force responsive to state demand had been established.257
The Senate had one final proclamation to make that day which effectively solidified its
authority and guaranteed that it would remain the body responsible for the organization of
coercive means. In the proclamation’s first section, the Senate announced that all the city’s
residents were required to give a certain amount of their private stock of gunpowder or pay the
equivalent directly to the police department so that policing and the nightwatch could continue.
The second section, however, went a step further by making the ownership of gun powder,
whether as a private citizen or as a soldier, illegal. City authorities not only encouraged fellow
citizens to report anyone who was known to have large stock-piles of powder, they threatened to
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imprison and fine those who did not turn over their remaining stores of powder to city authorities
within twenty-four hours.258 If politics, as prolific social historian Charles Tilly argues, is about
governing and the exercise of authority, that authority, he suggests, is grounded in the state’s
ability to monopolize coercive resources in defense of its interests.259 While a fear of continued
post-war violence may have informed the Senate’s insistence on collecting all private stores of
powder, the fact that a returning and, in the eyes of a number of prominent Hamburgers, suspect
government was willing to go so far as to incarcerate, suggests that the Senate had learned a
fundamental lesson about post-Napoleonic political authority.260 As the relationship between the
state and its population evolved throughout the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
conflicting ideological positions were required not only to win adherents in a bourgeoning public
sphere but also to be defended by force when necessary.261 And while the returning Senate
would not face a serious armed threat, their initial police measures indicate that the Senate
clearly understood the importance of a hierarchical monopolization of force and its centrality for
the establishment and defense of legitimacy and authority.
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The structure of the new police authority in Hamburg would largely follow the model put
in place by Chief of Police d’Aubignosc in February 1811. On 26 May, the Senate named two of
its own, Senators Dr. Johann Heinrich Bartels and Dr. Brunnemann, as the provisional
“managers” (Handhabung) of police policy and security.262 The Senate also made provisions for
the police authority to be stationed in the City Hall (Rathaus) on Neuerwall, one of Hamburg’s
main thoroughfares.263 The placing of the police department within the City Hall is important to
consider for a number of reasons. On a purely practical level, it was thought that the
centralization of the police administration would allow Hamburgers to find the necessary
personnel “by night or by day.”264 The placement of the police department in City Hall also had
a certain symbolic power as it was undoubtedly a calculated demonstration of authority which
grounded the legitimacy of the returning Senate in its ability to preserve order through the use of
armed force. And finally, it had a purely political function that clearly stated to the population
that no post-war power vacuum existed in Hamburg.265 The fact that the police department was
headed by members of the Senate also guaranteed that the department would serve the interests
of the government which would become increasing conservative in the post-war years.
Once again, aping the French model, the police authority in Hamburg instituted a
hierarchical chain of command and policed the city in much the same way the French had done
after 1811. Serving directly under Brunnemann and Bartles was one “Bruchvoigt,” a position
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similar to Hamburg’s old Prätur (however, stripped of its policy-making function), charged with
the translation and execution of policy. Two city sheriffs (Gerichtdiener), Herr Clausen and
Herr Galle, were placed under the immediate control of the Bruchvoigt and served in a similar
capacity as the French Huissier de justice, processing arrests, executing court orders, and
confiscating illegal goods.266 The actual policing of Hamburg’s six districts fell to sixteen armed
officers (Unterofficianten).267 While these men were not initially issued uniforms, the officer’s
presence was to be signaled by their lawful bearing of arms: a musket, a bandolier, and a saber at
their hip.268 Restrictions against private persons owning or carrying powder and firearms in
public makes sense when officers of the law had no other way in which to distinguish
themselves. It is unclear to what extent these early formations of the police actually were
recognized. Repeated insistence from the Senate that respect towards armed officers was
mandatory suggests that the institution was not immediately welcomed with open arms.269
For the time being, however, the city itself had much to celebrate. On 31 May, Russian
General Levin August Gottlieb Theophil, Count von Bennigsen, a German in the service of the
Tsar, along with David Mettlerkamp, triumphantly led Allied troops and the Hanseatic Citizens
Militia into Hamburg. Once again the city welcomed the Hanseatic Citizens Militia and Russian
Cossacks as liberators and saviors of the city and celebrated its final liberation with a day of
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festivities remembered as being more joyous than the liberation in March 1813.270 On 28 May,
parade routes were published alongside a series of ordinances that restricted travel along
Hamburg’s most busy thoroughfares. All traffic in and out of the city was to be stopped
promptly at 11 o’clock so that the parade could begin at noon. Hamburgers were also warned of
a heavy police presence throughout the entire afternoon and that arrests would be made against
those who could not keep themselves or their children under control.271 That afternoon, as bells
tolled in every church, soldiers marched from Hamburg’s Heiligengeistfeld through the city’s
western gate where several white-clad women crowned the men with wreaths of flowers. Homes
along the parade route were filled with women and men who waved white handkerchiefs while
young men and women covered the marching soldiers with flowers from second story windows.
That afternoon, all inhabitants of the city were required by the Senate to attend a speech given by
General Bennigsen outside Hamburg’s theater.272 The speech concluded with a performance of
the play, Tag der Erlösung, given in honor of the city’s liberators as well as Hamburg’s allies
(Austria, Prussia, Sweden, England, Russia, and Spain) in the struggle against the usurper
Napoleon.273
Throughout the following weeks, both theatrical presentations and Hamburg’s press
began openly ridiculing Davout and Napoleon. A series of plays and mock “confessions”
emphasized the material and human cost of eight years of French occupation (even if sometimes
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sensationalized).274 These plays often depicted a woeful Davout, crying at the feet of Louis
XVIII, who was represented as the definition of legitimate authority and God’s chosen medium
of justice in France. Napoleon himself was often chased across the stage by mounted Cossacks
and lectured to by a collection of “such righteous ghosts as Denghien, Palm, Hofer, Schill, and
Nelson” as to the folly of his ambitions.275 Hamburg’s press also vilified the French, leading not
only to increased violence against wounded French soldiers but also to a general anti-French
sentiment that the returning Senate would exploit in the coming months. Locals who had
maintained too close a relationship with French authorities or who visibly cooperated with the
Imperial administration were also subject to scrutiny from the local press.276
The returning Senate wasted little time in preparing festivals to honor the sacrifice of the
Hanseatic Citizens Militia while simultaneously presenting themselves as the legitimate heirs of
the armed struggle against Napoleon. On 24 June, the Hanseatic Citizens Militia marched
through the city where they were welcomed by church bells and the loud cheers of onlookers.
Stopping at one of Hamburg’s largest public squares, the Neuenmarkt, a number of the city’s
Senators made speeches and, according the one newspaper, “magnified the solemnity of the
event through their very presence.”277 At St. Michael’s church, in 1814 positioned at the
southern end of Neuenmarkt, Senator and senior member of Hamburg’s city ministry, led the
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crowd in a rendition of “A Mighty Fortress is our God,” while the flags of the Citizens Militia
were hung above the church’s alter. The ceremony, according to the Hamburgischer
Correspondent, was attended by an “incredible amount of people” and ended after the Citizens
Militia slowly marched to the City Hall where David Mettlerkamp, commander of the militia,
gave a speech announcing the restoration of peace. A similar event was held on 30 June, when
the Hanseatic Legion followed the Hanseatic Citizens Militia into Hamburg. The Legion
paraded through Hamburg’s streets, where young girls crowned the soldiers with garlands.
Toasts and speeches were given, while songs and sermons were offered throughout the city.
Lively festivities continued well into the evening as city residents voluntarily lit candles in their
windows and offered Legionnaires a huge feast of meat, bread, wine, beer, delicate confections,
smoked salmon, lobster, strawberries, tobacco, and cigars. Even Hamburg’s poor were said to
have eaten to excess (relatively speaking).278
The Hanseatic Citizens Militia and the Hanseatic Legion had returned to a grateful city
and Imperial occupation had officially come to an end. A Senate had been reestablished, a
substantially more modern police authority patrolled the city’s streets, and ships soon lined
Hamburg’s harbor.279 But as exiles and refugees returned home, many did not recognize the city
they had recently left. Hamburg’s suburbs and thriving gardens had been burnt to the ground, its
once tree-lined promenades were now vacant military installations, and all the city’s vegetation
had either been hacked down or had withered and died. Excrement and cadavers (human and
animal) were piled high along the city’s streets and filled the canals; the city,
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according to one contemporary, was the very “imagine of destruction.”280 Hamburgers now
turned their attention to the cleaning of city streets and destroyed churches while reclaiming their
homes and businesses. For years to come, the city would be reminded of its years of occupation
as the number of orphaned children skyrocketed and lingering disease posed perpetual threat.
The Senate now turned its attention to the securing of its authority and the return of traditional
government which would, however, cut all ties with Hamburg’s long-established sense of civic
patriotism that had emphasized the common good. The post-1814 Senate would respond to the
needs of a growing city in an increasingly laissez-faire and defensive manner. 281

Political Restoration, Economic Revival, and the Triumph of laissez-faire in Hamburg
While the recovery of Hamburg’s economy occupied the attention of most of the city’s
inhabitants in the months following liberation, close attention to public debates and a string of
civic ordinances suggests that the returning Senate was not without its detractors. Also, it is
clear that throughout the following year, the government’s authority was never entirely secure.
However, the outcome of these same debates and the ability of the Senate to successfully
articulate itself as the rightful heir of the struggle against the French, guaranteed that the Senate
and with it, Hamburg’s 1712 constitution, would remain intact. After the Senate had emerged
victorious from a series of political battles it could turn its attention to pressing fiscal and social
issues. Historians of Hamburg have noted that the men who ruled Hamburg after 1815 would be
the same ones who had ruled it before 1806. And while the post-war elites would remain
280
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politically conservative, the Senate would eventually introduce liberal social and economic
reform that marked a break with its republican past. The need for both collective controls on the
economy as well as on social welfare would be disregarded as collective civic duty gave way to a
French-inspired sense of individual responsibility. The failure to introduce Liberal political
institutions would guarantee that government in Vormärz Hamburg (and at least until 1860)
would remain in the hands of an ever-shrinking pool of elites who would increasingly rely on
police authority to identify and control new classes of social undesirables.
Debate regarding constitutional reform dominated public discussion in the months after
France’s final evacuation. As Mary Lindemann has noted, plans for constitutional reform in
Hamburg had existed before the Revolution blew hurricane winds of reform northward. Most of
Hamburg’s elite, though, were horrified by the events in France and agreed with French émigré
Charles de Villers that Hamburg’s 1712 constitution was “a masterpiece of political organization
for a small state.” 282 Yet the Revolution did, in fact, find numerous adherents among the elite,
prompting the Senate to convene a Reorganization Deputation in late 1814. The Deputation was
to consider various proposals and to draft a set of improvements to Hamburg’s constitution.
Twenty members (hence their name, the Twenty) were drawn from existing government bodies,
such as the Senate, the Treasury, and the Chamber of Commerce, most of whom were intimately
tied to Hamburg’s traditional political structure. Eventually, the Twenty drafted a thirty-sixpoint proposal for modifications to the constitution, none of which could be considered even
remotely radical. Of these thirty-six points, the most important called for the French-style
separation of justice from administration (previously connected in the person of the Prätur and
the Weddeherren),283 the election of Oberalten284 (a significant step towards the separation of
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church and state functions), the easing of Hamburg’s restrictions on immigration, citizenship for
Jews, and the restructuring of city finances. Few of the Deputation’s initiatives found their
backers and reform was ultimately very limited; as Mary Lindemann has argued, representative
government in post-war Hamburg never received full study.285 The Senate’s ability to co-opt
calls for reform by initiating and organizing a Deputation run by individuals whose careers
depended on the very continuation of a sociopolitical structure the old constitution inherently
propped up, is a masterful stroke of modern, self-serving politics.
Calls for constitutional change dominated public discussion as leading reformers, as well
as Hamburg’s press, continued to advocate fundamental reform, especially in the realm of civic
rights and criminal law.286 In addition, following the city’s final liberation, numerous publicists
criticized the Senate, charging it with illegitimacy and cowardice, pointing to the Senate’s lack of
commitment to the city’s defense and its willingness to sell the city out to the French. 287 This
outpouring of public attacks was referred to as the “war of the pens” (Federkrieg) and counted as
one of its most out-spoken and well-respected voices Jonas Ludwig von Heß, the Citizens
Militia’s first acting commander. Heß openly criticized the Senate and demanded it publicly
recognize its treachery in negotiating with the French in May 1813.288 Others soon joined in
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publicly denouncing the Senate, including a well-known city pastor who found Heß and his
compatriots’ arguments relevant and morally compelling.289 Hamburg’s press also quite openly
joined in the call for constitutional reform. In three monthly articles appearing in September
through November, the Hamburg newspaper, Orient, oder Hamburgisches Morgenblatt,
championed constitutional reform and asked, rhetorically, why little had been accomplished.290
The Senate, however, was able to counter public outcry by successfully labeling
reformers, even moderates, as demagogues and as the party of unrest. Harnessing popular antiFrench sentiment, the conservative Senate galvanized anti-reform opinion by reminding the
public of the disasters of French-style reform. The Senate also stressed the inherent cost of
reform, the possible legal complications, as well as the loss of certain religious privileges.291
Members of the Hanseatic Directory, established in 1813 by exiled patriots such as Perthes,
Beneke, Mettlerkamp, von Heß, and even moderates such as former mayor Abendroth, were
regarded by the Senate with suspicion and referred to as “revolutionary demagogues and
enthusiasts.”292 The Senate’s public campaign against social and political reformers was
eventually successful, not only because it was able to co-opt the reform movement through the
government-sponsored Deputation, but because it was able to tie reform to the horrors of
Imperial occupation. With the public outcry for reform largely silenced by early-1815, the
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Senate was then able to press its interests through a series of new ordinances and through
choreographed spectacle that sought to establish the Senate as the legitimate heir of the so-called
Wars of Liberation.
On 14 January 1815, the Senate celebrated the sacrifices of the Citizens Militia with two
days of festivities to be held in its honor. That evening, the festivities began with a series of
prayers and vigils offered throughout Hamburg’s churches. It was a solemn event that came to
an end when the Senate officially made Count von Bennigsen a citizen while offering its
condolences to those men who, knowing their city had fallen to the French, had continued the
fight.293 The following afternoon, the Citizens Militia gathered under torchlight at Gänsemarkt, a
large public square, to reenact its establishment. Accompanied by a corps of Hamburg’s best
musicians, the Citizens Militia, joined by a corps of cavalry, marched slowly to the center of the
city via Jungfernstieg, one of Hamburg’s best-known promenades. One witness reported that the
large crowd seemed to be moving as one with the soldiers. 294 The event came to an end when
the parade stopped in front of the City Hall, where members of Hamburg’s Military Commission
and numerous Senators were on hand to meet them. The militiamen then formed a circle around
the city’s governing elite, where the Senators offered praise of the soldier’s sacrifice not just for
the city but for the safe return of traditional government, which the post-war Senate claimed to
represent.295
Throughout the following year, the Senate participated in numerous public festivities all
of which tied military service to the city with service to traditional government. In March 1815,
the city awarded medals of honor to members of the Citizens Militia and gave ceremonial “keys
293
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of the city” to Mettlerkamp for his service, with a subsequent parade.296 On 31 May of that year,
the Senate announced a great parade to celebrate its first year of liberation. Beginning on
Heiligengeistfeld, a parade once again wrapped its way through Hamburg, ending at City Hall. 297
More than any other event to date, this bit of spectacle tied the Senate and Hamburg’s “perfect
Constitution” together with the struggle of the Citizens Militia. Senators performed an extended
review of Hamburg’s military forces and four Senators, Johann Bartles, Jencquel, Johann Ernst
Friedrich Westphalen, and Stephan Hasse were awarded Hanseatic medals for their participation
in the Wars of Liberation.298 The city celebrated Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo and the
role the Senate had in the “achieving of a prosperous peace” on 28 June 1815.299 Such public
spectacle would continue throughout the nineteenth century, all of which would celebrate the
role the Senate played in Hamburg’s liberation. In October 1817, the Battle of Leipzig (16-19
October, 1813) became the city’s official holiday as it marked both the beginning of the end for
the French in Hamburg and the eventual return of the Senate.300
By the beginning of 1815 the Senate’s authority and legitimacy were no longer at stake.
The city had been granted its independence by the Congress of Vienna and had its governing
body and constitution ratified by the Great Powers. The Senate had emerged successful in its
highly publicized struggle against would-be reformers and a mechanism for the enforcement of
its authority was established in the form of the city’s police. But the Senate’s public displays of
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armed force continued throughout the nineteenth century. Such spectacle acted as a medium for
the Senate to represent itself publicly as the legitimate defender of order, security, and private
property. But these events also fulfilled a basic post-Napoleonic political reality, as sovereignty
and legitimate authority were now based on the state’s total monopolization of the means of
coercion and ability to defend its established legal order with force. 301 After 1814, politics had
become officially militarized in the city of Hamburg. And as the nineteenth century progressed,
and as Hamburg’s government faced increasing calls for constitutional reform, the Senate, which
represented the interests of a shrinking pool of elites, could counter such threats to its authority
through recourse to armed force. It would not be until 1860, after almost five decades of unrest,
that serious changes to Hamburg’s civic government were finally enacted that would liberalize
the city’s political institutions, end the three centuries of cooperation between church and state,
extend full legal equality to religious minorities, and extend citizenship rights to all tax-paying
citizens.302
The generation of men who governed Hamburg during the occupation and after 1815
held a vastly different view of the Senate’s social responsibility then the body of men who
governed in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. As Mary Lindemann has argued,
specifically in the case of Hamburg’s famed Poor Relief, after 1815, “quite simply,” the city’s
governors had lost their “social conscience” as they openly refuted the traditional sense of
community, patriotism, and civic responsibility that had motivated previous generations. 303 As
the Senate rejected or co-opted challenges to the sociopolitical structure it represented, it also
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began adopting a new laissez-faire and noninterventionist approach to social issues and ignored
fundamental concerns of the recovering city while regulating its growing population through its
police. After Hamburg’s economy suffered massive upheavals in the 1750s and 60s, reformers
and intellectuals, influenced by the spread of Enlightenment ideals, began to rethink the role of
government, arguing that economic control and planning should be the main concern of a
centralized and, increasingly, paternalist government. Poverty was redefined by these
Enlightenment thinkers as the outcome of impersonal workings of economies and not as
punishment for sin. Patriotism in late-eighteenth century Hamburg, then, was defined by one’s
commitment to the welfare of the city: political careers began in poor relief, and poor relief
became the business of government.304
In a post-war environment that emphasized economic recovery, an emerging philosophy
of economic liberalism that celebrated the interests of the individual flourished while the role of
government in the community dwindled. As was the case in 1815, when the wealthy fought to
regain lost income and the middle classes struggled against impoverishment, those who would
appeal to the government for assistance were labeled as “immoral,” “unbelievably vicious,”
“degenerate,” and “depraved”: poverty had become a personal flaw of the lower classes.305 And
while the city did maintain some forms of poor relief, notably for the registered poor, such as
free schooling, a one-time allotment of clothing, and medical care, many of the relief programs
304
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once offered by Hamburg’s famed Poor Relief would be pruned altogether. By July 1815, the
Senate had already begun issuing orders for the arrest of those who could either not show proof
of poor registration or proof of employment.306 Similar laws followed that sought to dissuade
individuals from offering charity, whether in the form of money or clothing, to orphaned
children.307 As the prevention of poverty increasingly appeared as idealistic and “naïve,” the
Senate focused more on the alleviation of preexisting problems. Free health care soon was
identified as a “cause” of poverty as it was argued that fathers abused the system, relying on free
aid rather than working to support their children, who were always too numerous. Between 1820
and 1829, several tight restrictions were placed on medical care: recipients were forced to have
their documents embossed with the sigil of the Poor Relief, allowing them to be easily
recognized, and were forced to “donate” their remaining possessions to the Relief. By 1830,
poor families were no longer able to receive any monetary support for any type of illness. 308
The Senate also relied far more heavily on its police authority who dealt with the
identifying and arresting of recalcitrants and recidivists. In 1821, the city streamlined its police
bureaucracy and created two permanent positions of First and Second Police Chief (Erster and
Zweiter Polizeiherr).309 On 16 February 1821, Amandus Abendroth, Hamburg’s mayor during
the French occupation, returned to City Hall as the city’s First Police Chief.310 However,
Abendroth’s appointment, and his plan to extend the scope of police authority by supporting
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efforts to help combat misery among Hamburg’s lower classes, received little welcome.311
Senator Martin Hieronrymus Hudtwalcker, a leading figure in Hamburg’s post-war religious
revival (Erweckungsbewegung), argued that the police authority must only act as a “paternal
guardian” and that individuals’ exposure to government intrusion should be minimized at all
costs in defense of individual freedom. He pointed to England where, he argued, “men” are so
over-governed that they are little more than “machines” and that increased government intrusion
often led to a certain litigiousness that would prove disastrous to business.312 The debates
regarding the nature of the police force and the role the city government should play in
protecting its citizenry were happening as the number of families in need of support was
skyrocketing. In 1817, 9,089 persons obtained some form of medical care from the city; by 1821
the number had increased to 16,442 persons. These statistics shocked the Senate, who attributed
such an increase to excessive generosity and began slashing medical care, schooling, and makework schemes, citing the individual’s need to escape oppressive government assistance.313
The size and scope of the police authority grew through the 1820s and took on a much
more modern, militarized form. As the Chief of Police, Abendroth was responsible for four
subordinate officers (Unterbeamten), three official scribes (Schreibern), forty officers, and three
stewards (Aufwärter) who supervised the running of the department. Officers were now
equipped with weapons as well as with a large metal shield pinned to their chest.314 In March
1822, the city night watch received a thorough reworking that saw its character become
increasingly more professionalized. Headed by a Captain and staffed by two lieutenants, twelve
311
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sergeants, twelve corporals, two drummers, and 390 citizens (Gemeinen), the night watch
patrolled the streets and the city’s gates from nine o’clock in the evening (eight in the winter)
until six o’clock in the morning.315 Security and the protection of private property were first
priorities of the police authority, however, actively preventing petty theft, fraud, public
drunkenness, and the investigation and prosecution of “community concerns” were now part of
the police authority’s job description. Punishments for such crimes - considered to be of the
“Second Instance” - increased, adding a two to five month incarceration period to the traditional
fifteen Thaler fine. Series offences - violent crimes or “First Instance” - were now punished with
up to six years of incarceration.316 The defense of order and security in Hamburg had taken a
harsh and rather modern turn. In a paradoxical twist, as the Senate moved away from public
support programs in order not to over-govern, laws became more numerous and stringent,
increasing police repression as well as the mechanisms necessary to identify and prosecute new
categories of criminals. While the topic requires a considerable amount of research, this study
would suggest that increased legislation and policing efforts in Hamburg after 1815 led only to a
perceived need to legislate and police.
Yet voices for social and political reform would never truly disappear. Casper Voght, the
original founder of Hamburg’s poor relief, continued to lobby the Senate until 1830 for increased
attention to the city’s relief efforts. He argued that the lack of support for the most basic
subsistence, vocational, and educational programs were not only immoral but posed a threat to
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the future of the city.317 He lamented a lack of the personal and financial resolve necessary to
address adequately the rapidly increasing number of Hamburg’s poor. He also decried the loss
of honorary offices and civic institutions that had once been able to support the poor.318 Voght’s
propositions, however, found few proponents in the Senate as his eighteenth-century approach to
community welfare had, by 1815, become passé. One of the few remaining Poor Officers from
the older generation, Ferdinand Beneke, resigned from his office with some eighty families still
under his charge. Men of the next generation were unwilling to follow Beneke’s or Voght’s
example as community welfare ceased being a crucial aspect of Patiotismus.319 As the
nineteenth century wore on, middle-class reformers, troubled by the growing needs of
Hamburg’s poor, the rise of Social Democrats, and apathetic urban elites, turned to the
promotion of personal responsibility in the lower classes through character education (Bildung).
Education became central to nineteenth-century concepts of reform that focused on individual
self-improvement as one’s civic duty.320 And while the state would eventually assume the
control over a number of programs initiated by private organizations, any sense of the
eighteenth-century “spirit of utilitarian cooperation” between public and private organizations
was dead.321
In the years following the Senate’s reestablishment, there was no revival of the city’s
traditional sense of patriotism based on the promotion of the wellbeing of the community. The
Senate increasingly responded to Hamburg’s growing needs in a defensive and libertarian
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manner, using its policing forces to control a growing mass of urban poor rather than finding
ways to alleviate their condition. The Senate had abandoned any sense that economic structures
or dislocations in the economy - over which individuals had little control - “principally
determined” the level of poverty among Hamburg’s lower classes. They insisted that poverty
was a personal flaw of certain individuals who created their own misery by frivolous marriage,
disordered households, and thoughtless living. As Hamburg’s elites retreated from any sense of
social accountability or responsibility for the common good, they also began closing their ranks.
Up until 1806, twenty percent of Hamburg’s inhabitants were actual citizens, by 1870 only eight
percent of the city’s inhabitants were citizens. 322 In this environment, Hamburg’s poor and
working classes were completely shut out from the community and left with no guardians or
champions in city government. It took disasters such as the Great Fire of 1842 (which leveled
twenty-five percent of the city), working-class politicization in the 1860s, and a series of deadly
cholera epidemics to demonstrate to Hamburg’s elite the deficiency of the city’s civic
infrastructure and need for constitutional reform.323
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Chapter 3
Political Culture and Public Space in Hamburg, 1815-1820:
Updating Jürgen Habermas’s Concept of Representative Publicness
for the Nineteenth Century
On 26 May 1814, Hamburg’s Senate in exile announced that the second French
occupation of the city had officially come to an end.324 On 31 May, accompanied by Russian
General Bennigsen, captains of the Hanseatic Legion, and the entire Hanseatic Citizens Militia,
Hamburg’s Senators entered the city’s gates and proclaimed an end to the “deep sleep of
slavery” brought on by eight years of Napoleonic occupation. The members of the reconvened
Senate claimed that it was now the official “duty” of every citizen to recognize their authority so
that peace and order could prevail. Four days later, the Senate announced the creation of a police
ministry, and a city-wide ban against private ownership of stocks of powder and munitions. As
Hamburg’s authorities moved quickly to secure a complete monopolization of armed force, they
also prepared a series of parades to honor the city’s liberation as well as the soldiers who fought
and died in the great Battle of Leipzig in (16-19) October 1813. On 24 June, all seven battalions
of the Hanseatic Citizens Militia marched throughout the city to the ringing of church bells.
Hamburg’s flag, a white tri-towered castle on a red-field, not flown since 1806, was hung
throughout the city and accompanied the Hanseatic Legion’s flag that was draped over the altar
of St. Michael’s Church, which, until very recently, had been requisitioned as a stable for French
horses.325 The event drew thousands of spectators and a number of individuals remarked on the
emotionally charged atmosphere, claiming the ceremony as one of their most cherished
memories. Yet, as one observer reported, the solemnity of the event was heightened by the very
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presence of distinguished members of the city’s Senate who, outside the church, offered praise to
the sacrifices of Hamburg’s soldiers and stressed the importance of rallying around the Senate’s
leadership.
Similar parades followed in June, July, September, and October1814 and in January,
March, April, June, and October 1815, all of which not only publically showcased the Senate in
dramatic fashion but, in effect, reinforced its claim to authority by connecting post-war peace,
order, and prosperity with the Senate’s control over professionalized armed forces. These events
also positioned Hamburg’s returning Senate as the rightful heir of the struggle against Napoleon,
grounding their legitimacy in the defense of traditional authority. Debate regarding the nature of
Hamburg’s post-war government swirled in the immediate aftermath of the occupation. By the
mid-eighteenth century, Hamburg had one of Europe’s most lively public spheres, with
internationally recognized newspapers and journals and numerous coffee shops and public
houses that were the envy of the rest of the continent. Yet the struggle over the nature of
Hamburg’s post-war political structure did not always take place in print. Parades and public
ceremonies established Hamburg’s city streets, promenades, public squares, and churches as
stages for the articulation and practice of politics. Public space in Hamburg had played host to
lower class protest in defense of what E.P. Thompsons referred to as a “moral economy,” or the
defense of traditional economic rights. Yet, city space in the eighteenth century had yet to
become fully politicized, a phenomenon born out of the French Revolution and one central to the
political culture of the nineteenth century.
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Politics of the Public Sphere: Assessing Jürgen Habermas’s Relevance for
Nineteenth-Century German History
Published in 1962 as his Habilitationsschrift at the Frankfurt School’s Institute for Social
Research, Jürgen Habermas’s Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchen zu einer Kategorie
der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, initially received little international attention. By the mid-1980s,
a re-examination of Habermas’s first and most historical work was underway, led by mainstream
historians, specifically those working on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France and America.
In 1989, the book was translated into English as The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere, and soon sparked one of the most significant historiographical developments of the last
twenty years. 326 By the mid-1990s dozens of interdisciplinary case studies had already been
written under the aegis of the theory, leading one historian to comment with thinly-veiled
contempt that the concept had become a prescriptive disciplinary category to be invoked “in
studies that aspire to significance.”327 Nevertheless, the “public sphere” has become an
indispensable concept for historians of the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and has come
to inform any discussion regarding the emergence of modern political culture. Yet the history of
the public sphere and its relation to emerging nineteenth-century political cultures throughout
Germany (and vice versa) is still rather rudimentary.
In Habermas’s formulation, the public sphere is a politically neutral zone of
communication that accommodates a plethora of voices. By the eighteenth century, he argues, a
Western European and North American “public” had informed and organized itself as a cultural
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and political force powerful enough to erode the foundations upon which the old regime had
stood for centuries.328 This “imagined collectivity” positioned itself, then, as the only legitimate
subject of public affairs, in effect redefining the theoretical precepts of statecraft.329 Scholars
point to the rise of new reading practices that promoted a “sensibility of individualism” that sat
uncomfortably within a world of collective identities and corporate society. The spread of
reading material opened up a broader spectrum of expectation and experience among eighteenthcentury readers, who eventually came to question the social and political privileges of
birthright.330 And while absolutist rulers sought to disseminate knowledge in order to shape
more efficient and productive subjects, these reading publics eventually perceived the
“transparency” and “publicity” of Öffentlichkeit as a means of initiating reform and placing
checks on arbitrary rule. Concepts such as “rationality” and “natural law” also helped
individuals reimagine “subjects” as rights-bearing “citizens.” Following the outbreak of
revolution, many Europeans began to define sovereignty not only as “dynastic prerogative” but
as the collective will of the nation.331 In fact, the very concept of the nation as a political
community, imagined or otherwise, is difficult to conceive without reference to “public opinion.”
Habermas’s definition of the public sphere would, not surprisingly, be severely critiqued,
reimagined, and ultimately redefined, as historians began questioning the accuracy of the
328
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concept.332 For example, by addressing the normative exclusion of women from the public
sphere, historians initially critique the concept’s claim to universality.333 Similarly, other
historians have questioned whether or not “opinion formation” is class-specific and necessarily
national in nature.334 Social histories of “Grub Street” printers and journalists have also added
correctives to Habermas’s claim that print culture was, first and foremost, a medium for rational
and critical debate.335 Recent work has also queried Habermas’s insistence on strict dichotomies
regarding state and society and private and public: where Habermas posited division, these
studies suggest certain interconnectivities.336 And finally, numerous scholars have disavowed
the concept altogether.337 As early as 1994, Robert Darnton had warned historians that the
public sphere was already being assigned “exaggerated claims of agency” and that the concept
332
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was in danger of being “reified as a thing-in-itself, a causal agent that produces effects.”338 It is
clear that the public sphere, as a concept, functions largely as an ideal-type and should be
considered as part of the modern West’s political imaginary rather than a concrete, universal
space of rational communication. With this and other critiques in mind, however, the term
remains a useful analytical tool allowing historians to grasp how and where politics happen.
As James Brophy has succinctly stated, for historians of eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury Germany, the most obvious criticism of The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere is the little attention it pays to specific German conditions.339 Throughout the book,
Habermas repeatedly distinguishes between a nascent literary public sphere and a subsequent and
more fully-formed political public sphere, while not adequately addressing the question of how,
when or even why such a transformation occurred.340 As such, the literary and political spheres
have largely been handled separately. As Brophy points out, historians have “sketchy
impressions” of how clubs, lodges, reading societies and other voluntary associations produced a
“social field” wherein which various publics could access concepts such as nationality,
citizenship, popular sovereignty, or individual rights.341 The effect has been the creation of an
historical void between eighteenth-century historians who draw attention to a nascent bourgeois
public sphere, and nineteenth-century historians whose research on the politics of the Vormärz
period presupposes the existence of an established public sphere and a fully-formed bourgeois
338

“Book History, the State of Play: An Interview with Robert Darnton” SHARP News (Society for the
History of Authorship, Reading, and Publishing) Vol. 3 (Summer, 1994): 1-8, here 3.
339

Brophy, “Carnival and Citizenship,” 875.

340

Habermas, Structural Transformation, 71-3.

341

Brophy, “Carnival and Citizenship,” 875. The emergence of table societies (Tischgesellschaften),
literary societies, and clubs, or what Habermas refers to as literarische Öffentlichkeit, is an established theme in the
German-language historiography. The study of early political organizations in post-1815 Central Europe is equally
well researched. The number of such works is far too numerous to be cited handily here. For a succinct breakdown
of the two competing schools of historical discourses, see Brophy, Popular Culture and the Public Sphere, 7-8 (n.
21).

109

political culture.342 It is crucial for historians of the German nineteenth century then, to uncover
the conditions under which the public sphere emerged and the ways it was utilized by competing
political discourses. Documenting the distinct regional or urban political behavior, such as that
in post-1815 Hamburg, will allow for historians to understand the events leading up to and
proceeding the Revolutions of 1848.
A concept of the public sphere remains meaningful as it provides historians with a useful,
if somewhat broad, analytical tool to discuss the articulation, practice, and efficacy of politics in
the modern era. First, it leads historians to question where politics takes place, which offers a
more nuanced and complex understanding of such a question. Second, it helps historians think
about the ways individuals access specific public identities in which they act through politically,
while also uncovering just how identities are formed. 343 Third, it challenges teleological
accounts of the development of modern politics, showing politics as a series of opposing
articulations and not as “ideal-types.”344 And finally, as Belinda Davis has argued, the concept is
important as it complicates an imposed binary of “good” and “bad” politics, based on
“rationality” verses “emotion,” and, applied as such, problematizes (rather than naturalizes) the
concept’s application.345 These, then, are useful correctives to Habermas’s theory of the public
that allow for the fundamental components of the theory to remain intact while updating the
concept’s basic framework.
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One particularly fruitful avenue of revision is the work of historians who have begun to
stress the dynamics of public sociability and the public representation of authority, rather than
private individuals’ public use of enlightened reason.346 Over the course of the last three
decades, a series of historical studies have reexamined the role played by festive culture and
public space in German history.347 This body of research has drawn attention to the literal and
symbolic language and to the rituals of these festivals, through which new ideals of citizenship
and participation were articulated. Other work has focused on the specifically bourgeois
festivals of the post-Napoleonic era created explicitly for political purposes. Strung together
sequentially, large public events such as the Wartburg Festival (1817), the Nürnberger Feier of
Dürer (1828), the Hambach Fest (1832), the Gutenberg Festivals (1837-40), and the
revolutionary festivals of 1848-9 showcase evolving forms of “representative publicity” for
nineteenth-century bourgeois political culture.348 Others have similarly situated celebrations,
monument dedications, railroad building, and cultural associations within the context of
346
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Germany’s liberal-national movement.349 This avenue of research, then, has offered historians
new ways to understand how ritual, public representations of authority, and “oppositional
political discourse” has influenced popular culture and shaped the political agency of both
“common” social groups as well as state authorities.350
As James Brophy has pointed out, a key component of this historiographical trend is the
attention it pays to the sociopolitical construction of public space. Social control of public space,
as well as the cultural representations and the specific discourse regarding that space, has come
to define a critical aspect of political power and sovereignty.351 With the emergence of new
doctrines such as individual rights and popular sovereignty emanating out of the French
Revolution, the use of public space would likewise become increasingly complex and contested.
While the city of Hamburg itself would not see major constitutional reform until the 1860s (and
only after a series of monumental disasters) social identities and public life in the city after 1815
had been transformed. Whereas eighteenth-century artisans and burghers used city space to
stake claims or defend hard-won rights, change remained within the narrow framework of
traditional economic rights.352 But the precedent of French constitutionalism moved nineteenthcentury politics beyond such traditional concepts of liberty and politicized public space as an
349
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arena for the practice of legitimacy and authority. This may, perhaps, be the fundamental divide
between the social and political worlds of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
This recent scholarship has undercut Habermas’s insistence that “representative
publicness” and the modern politicized public sphere are mutually exclusive. A fundamental
aspect of Habermas’s work is an analysis of what is deemed “private” and what is thought of as
being “public.” The Middle Ages, he suggests early in The Structural Transformation, evidence
no clear distinction of “public” and “private” because a concept such as “private property” had
yet to be fully articulated.353 The men who exercised power represented their status in public in
non-abstracted medium, such as royal insignia, gesture, clothing, and rhetoric: power and
authority were performed by “being made present.”354 As long as the “prince and the estates of
the realm still ‘are’ the land,” rather than acting as mere deputies for it, Habermas continues,
“they are able to ‘re-present’; they represent their power ‘before’ the people, instead of for the
people.”355 This, then, is what Habermas titled “representative publicness,” which he argues is
successfully replaced by print culture after a long process that saw the emergence of a distinct
private sphere and, through the exchange of information (or, communication), a cohesive and
authoritative public sphere. 356
Historians are now becoming increasingly more aware of the ways in which parades,
ritual, ceremony, festival, and the dedication of monuments helped enact, articulate, or reassert
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authority throughout the nineteenth century.357 It should be stressed, however, that in
understanding the methods by which political identities are expressed, form and representation
are critical to content.358 Yet, the intersection of political discourse(s) and public space and the
effect on political culture has gone largely unexplored. How the social, political, and
institutional space of the public sphere (print culture) and popular culture (festival, ceremony,
public sociability) mutually affected one another has not been examined with any precision. 359
Habermas argues that by the time of the July Revolution in France, the eighteenth-century
moment of possibility for a universal public sphere had passed, as it had lost its coherence and
class exclusivity.360 Instead, nineteenth-century bourgeois culture, he contends, exclusively used
print culture and commercialization of the public sphere in an attempt to control the widening
publics of civil society. By looking at the ways in which Hamburg’s post-occupation
government used public space to represent their claims to legitimacy, it becomes clear that
representative publicness was not simply replaced by nineteenth-century print culture. On the
contrary, public space in the post-Napoleonic era played a central role in the assertion and
practice of modern political authority, authority based less on traditional notions of deference
towards wealth and status and predicated on the government’s ability to maintain order through
armed force.
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Politics and the Public Sphere in Hamburg
While initially claiming victory, Hamburg’s reinstated Senate was widely viewed as
being rather undistinguished and faced immediate pressure from prominent Hamburgers who
advocated reform similar to those enacted under Imperial rule (criminal law and civil rights,
separation of justice and administration, separation of political and church functions, political
equality). In a series of public showdowns between the Senate and reform-minded individuals,
referred to as “the war of the pens” (Federkreig), the Senate was charged by some with having
sold out the city too easily to the French while others stressed the immediate need for
constitutional reform. But the Senate was able to exploit popular anti-French sentiment by
successfully painting these reform parties as pro-French and by labeling reformers as
“revolutionary demagogues and enthusiasts.” By articulating itself as the only body able to
provide the peace and security necessary to revive their shattered economy, the Senate was
successful in co-opting reformists and eventually enacted a return to an antebellum constitution,
remaining socially noninterventionist while pursuing liberal economic policies that clearly suited
the interests of the commercial and governing elite. Despite the Senate’s success, calls for
reform would continue throughout the following years, as men such as Johann Bartels and
Ferdinand Beneke decried the Senate’s treatment of an increasing urban poor.361 Yet, the Senate,
concerned almost entirely with the question of how to rebuild Hamburg’s economy, continued to
refuse constitutional reform and maintained a staunch libertarian position throughout the
361
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nineteenth century. In response to the Senate’s resistance to political reform, one contemporary
boldly compared Hamburg’s Senate to the Bourbons, “who don’t forget but never learn.”362 And
while that may prove correct in regards to Hamburg’s antebellum constitution, the Senate did
learn a crucial lesson in modern politics: public space had become thoroughly politicized and
was transformed into a legitimate arena for the practice of politics.
Throughout the eighteenth century, Hamburg had an extremely vibrant print culture
which allowed Hamburgers to experience the “public sphere” on a regular basis, whether by
reading newspapers, journals, or sermons or discussing both local and international news with
others in coffee houses, reading societies, bookshops, and other civic organizations. The
consumption of print in Hamburg was so enormous that it had struck one British traveler to
comment that “A newspaper is almost a necessity to the existence of an Englishman, and they
are still more eager after them here than anywhere else: the moment the mail is announced,
everyone is running to get a sight of them.”363 Other contemporaries describe a “craze for
reading” (Lesewut), a “reading mania” (Lesesucht), and a “ceaseless pen-pushing”
(Vielschreiberei) which underscores a common image of the Hamburger as a reader (and ergo, a
political creature) while also pointing towards a general printing revolution experienced
throughout German Central Europe.364 As in France and Britain, the press in Germany was
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instrumental in creating and politicizing the public as it both replaced elitist language with
informal prose and ran stories expressing new political ideas that moderately educated
individuals could read.365
Much like the rest of Europe, Hamburg’s reading population followed the events of the
French Revolution closely, as literature on events in France eclipsed all other news. Locals
commented on the press and pamphlet literature’s inability to satiate Hamburger’s interest in the
events of 1789-1792. The events of the Revolution were greeted positively by most locals and
were overwhelming supported by Hamburg’s educated elites, as the reforms were held as
confirmation of their own “enlightened attitudes.”366 A number of Hamburg’s prominent
citizens, such as Jonas Ludwig von Heß, Georg Sieveking, and Caspar Voght, regularly traveled
to Paris to witness the events while cultivating warm relations with individuals such as Charles
Maurice Talleyrand-Perigord, Charles de Villers, and even Madame de Staël. Some
Hamburgers, such as Leonhard Wächter, fought to defend the Tricolor during the war of the First
Coalition.367 By 1792, the city had a reputation among European conservatives for being a
known den of revolutionary Jacobin activity. And while Hamburg’s educated elite shared
sentiments with their revolutionary counterparts in Paris, their numbers and influence were
greatly exaggerated by the northern-European conservative press who applied the term Jakobiner
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rather freely (and pejoratively) to anyone who sympathized with the Revolution.368 Regardless
of the level of local revolutionary commitment, it is clear that Hamburg’s reading population was
aware of the swirling events of the Revolution, and that well-informed locals were discussing the
merits of the revolutionary rhetoric emanating out of Paris. Yet with such a cultivated public
sphere, considered to be one of the richest in all of Central Europe,369 Hamburg’s intellectuals
remained largely reform-minded, and tended to view the events of 1789 as evidence for the
validation and superiority of their own republic and their own constitution.
While the events of 1789 to 1793 had captured Hamburg’s imagination, wide-spread
agitation by the city’s laborers failed to capture support from the city’s would-be reformers. In
1791, 6,000-7,000 thousand artisans and journeymen took to the streets to protest the growing
power and exclusivity of Hamburg’s guilds.370 Similar to other uprisings throughout Central
Europe, such as in Saxony and Mainz in 1790 and in Schleswig-Holstein in 1792 and 1793, this
rebellion of laborers was deeply rooted in traditional patterns of urban life.371 Protesting against
the power of the guilds, demands for higher wages, better working conditions, and a reduction in
working hours, were well-established sources of contention in early modern Europe, and point
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more towards the defense of a moral economy rather than a new political ideology.372 As
Aaslestad has pointed out, despite the opportunity for revolutionary action, local “Jacobins” were
unable to connect a distinctly political agenda with the rebellion’s primary source of agitation:
their economic grievances.373 It has also been noted that the rebellion, which crippled public life
and eventually turned violent, likely cooled middle-class empathy for the Revolution as well as
for the cause of enhanced political rights for Hamburg’s laboring classes.374
Regardless of the rebellion’s outcome, the event is instructive as it entailed a distinctly
traditional use of public space that lacked the overtly politicized rhetoric and agenda future
workers movement would utilize. As compared to southern German towns, Berlin, or Vienna,
Hamburg remained relatively free of worker unrest until 1847 when bread prices skyrocketed
throughout Europe. This too suggests a pre-politicized laboring class whose attacks on symbolic
targets were largely understood in terms of a defense of a “moral economy.”375 But in the years
following French occupation, public space in Hamburg almost immediately was reimagined as a
site for the practice of authority and political legitimacy. The returning Senate was forced to
372
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defend itself against new and distinctly politicized threats to its hegemony, a clash evidenced not
only in Hamburg’s newspapers and journals but also on the city’s promenades and public
squares. It is to this process that we now must turn.

Public Space and the Establishment of Post-War Political Authority
As cited above, Hamburg’s public was not uniformly supportive of the Senate and many
turned to the city’s remaining public outlets to press for reforms to the constitution. As has also
been suggest, reformist opinion had found fertile ground in the late-eighteenth century with
Hamburg’s reading population. And while the bloody turn toward Terror in 1793, Revolutionary
war, and Napoleonic occupation had a substantial cooling effect on reformist zeal, calls for
liberal political reform resurfaced in 1814 and 1815. But in the immediate post-war
environment, when Hamburg’s war-weary population desired a return of order and security, the
Senate responded with shows of martial force that positioned them as the sole body able to
provide stability and hence, political legitimacy.
As early as 1 June 1814, the Senate began a series of highly-choreographed public
displays designed to politicize public space as an arena for the representation of their
authority.376 On 22 June, the city of Hamburg was virtually shut down as final preparations for a
festival celebrating the renovation of Hamburg’s pre-1806 Senate were completed. Event times
and parade routes were published in virtually all newspapers and journals, as well as made public
by a series of police orders. Travel throughout the city was severely restricted as major
thoroughfares were cordoned off as part of a route that wound its way through the city’s busiest
and most prestigious districts. Restrictions on the use of the city were followed by warnings
against public disorder and, added to this list of observances, was a somewhat curious
376
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announcement that shooting in the streets would no longer be tolerated. On 24 June, the parade
started at Hamburg’s Millerntor gate, on the southeast corner of the Heiligengeistfeld, as
Senators, accompanied by officers of the Hanseatic Legion, re-enacted their entrance into the
city after the final departure of the French in late May. The symbolic weight associated with a
liberating army marching through city gates was not lost on commentators who also compared
Hamburg’s soldiers to valiant Roman warriors and the city Senators to triumphant Roman
Generals. 377 The parade then passed through the square that housed Hamburg’s armory
(Zeughausmarkt) and to the Grosse Neumarkt, via Neuer Steinweg and passing St. Michael’s
Church, and up Neuerwall past the Rathaus. Wrapping around St. Peter’s Church, the parade
moved north to St. Jacob’s Church and continued past the city’s famed Zuchthaus (correction
house). From there, the parade followed Jungfernsteig, Hamburg’s most well-known
promenade, and exited through the gate at Dammtor.
That evening, a series of speeches were given outside of the Rathaus by members of the
Senate as well as by the newly appointed police minister, Johann Bartels, who spoke about the
need to accept the Senate’s judgment concerning the management of city affairs.378 Attendance
at these speeches was made mandatory for all citizens, who were to be marshaled by order of the
city police. The entire event ended later that evening with a fire-works display and an
illumination of street lights surrounding the City Hall while Hamburg’s flag was “officially”
raised, reinforcing to those in attendance that legitimate government had returned. This parade
and the following speeches connected many of Hamburg’s most important and politically
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charged sites: its armory, the center of city government, the city’s main promenade, its most
wealthy districts, and three of its five Hauptkirchen (the churches located within the city walls).
It is worth note that these three churches had been converted into stables or were used as
hospitals for Imperial soldiers during the final months of the occupation. Their incorporation in
the parade, then, was not only a reclaiming of sacred space but a symbolic linking of the city’s
traditional bodies of authority.
A similar event was held on 30 June, when the Hanseatic Legion followed the Hanseatic
Citizens Militia into Hamburg. The Legion paraded through Hamburg’s streets, where young
girls crowned the soldiers with garlands. Toasts and speeches were given, while songs and
sermons were offered throughout the city. Lively festivities continued well into the evening as
city residents voluntarily lit candles in their windows and offered Legionnaires a huge feast of
meat, bread, wine, beer, delicate confections, smoked salmon, lobster, strawberries, tobacco, and
cigars.379 While the festivities were relatively spontaneous, popular, and carried out with little
input from the Senate, the military parade and the accompanying songs and patriotic speeches
articulated the day’s events as celebrations of the return of order and security (Ruhe und
Sicherheit) and the triumph of Hamburg’s leadership as embodied by city authorities (political
and military). The Senate itself, though, would be front and center during a city-wide event
announced on 12 August.380 The event was to be held on Sunday, 14 August, in celebration of
the “Renovation” (Renovierung) of Hamburg’s pre-war Senate. That morning, services at all of
Hamburg’s churches were to be offered in the name of the Senate, who not only represented
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“just and honest authority” but did so through God’s “grace.” After the church service, a host of
Senators led a processional out of St. Michael’s Church, up to the City Hall on Neuerwall where
attendees gathered to hear a series of speeches.381
These events take on increased significance when read back into a context of the
immediate post-war setting. This was at the height of the Federkrieg, when the Senate’s
legitimacy was in question and when prominent individuals and entire newspapers were
publically calling for constitutional reform. By incorporating the church within the days events,
the Senate’s renovation, and the conservative socio-political order it represented, was invested
with a sense of legitimacy, as the Senate articulated itself as the defender of the faith and of
traditional authority. The speeches themselves freely mixed concepts such as order, security, and
legitimacy, while touching on the strength of Hamburg’s existing constitution and style of
government. The Senate’s rule was “just,” strengthened through the “flame of battle,” and only
sought to ensure order and prosperity for a “grateful population.”382 The event on 14 August,
then, was both a deft political maneuver and a masterful use of public space where the Senate’s
authority was represented to the population and its legitimacy symbolically enacted through a
tying together of sacred and secular space.
On 15-16 January 1815, city space was once again turned into stages for political theater.
On 15 January, the city celebrated the creation and triumph of its own Citizens Militia by staging
a dramatic re-enactment of the original enlisting of volunteers in the same marketplace where, in
1813, thousands of Hamburgers had eagerly joined.383 Senators and members of the city’s
military commission emerged from surrounding buildings to lead a procession of soldiers
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dressed in full parade uniform. Accompanied by forty-four of Hamburg’s best musicians and a
platoon of cavalrymen, the parade moved throughout the city via Hamburg’s main
promenades.384 One eye witness remarked on the movement of the crowd, estimated at some
10,000, which made it seem part of the spectacle.385 The day’s penultimate event was a speech
from General Bennigsen, who received thunderous applause when he announced that “bliss”
(Seligkeit) had returned to Hamburg’s citizens. The day was brought to a close when members
of the Citizens Militia, as well as their officers, encircled a number of senators, including Senator
Ernst Friedrich Johann Westphalen, who gave a speech in honor of the officers and citizensoldiers who fought in defense of their Vaterstadt and its age-old rights. The speech was
received with similar applause as Senator Westphalen announced to the crowd that “Hamburg
has been healed” and that the Senate is now working to “heal Hamburg’s citizens.”386 This last
piece of political performance not only reinforced the Senate’s right to speak on the behalf of a
grateful public, but it also represented the government as the protector of the city’s independence
and livelihood. It also hints at a theme which would occur in future events: by tying the Citizens
Militia’s service to the defense of traditional authority, Senator Westphalen positioned the Senate
as the legitimate heir of the struggle against the usurper, Napoleon.
If the connection between the reinstated Senate and the defense of traditional authority
had not been fully expressed, a highly-publicized event in January 1815 left no question as to the
Senate’s position regarding Restoration and the meaning of the Wars of Liberation. On 21
January, twenty-two years to the day after his beheading, St. Michael’s Church held a funeral for
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King Louis XVI, that “unfortunate victim of anarchy” whose “Christian majesty” both
“Frenchmen and German alike still recognized.”387 The church itself had been cleared so that
more individuals could gaze at the King’s “coffin,” which was raised upon a catafalque and
draped in white cloth, surrounded by white lilies, and adorned with “royal attributes.”388 Present
to witness the event were virtually the entire Senate as well as General Bennigsen, Prussian
Minister Graf Grote and his entire general staff, numerous General Consuls of other German
states, and, there on behalf of the French, was Commander Chevalier Monnay. An entire
detachment of the Citizens Militia was on hand to handle the large crowds that gathered
throughout the afternoon to catch a glimpse of the king’s “coffin.” It was remarked that the
service was “both solemn and noble” and that many men shed “tears of remembrance for the
most unfortunate of kings.” In an interesting twist, the same reporter suggested that Hamburg’s
misfortunes mirrored the king’s, and pondered whether or not “without his unfortunate death
would Hamburg have endured so much suffering?”389 This event not only positioned Hamburg’s
authorities on the side of traditional government, it also turned the events after the establishment
of the First French Republic into a European-wide tragedy, a tragedy that cost Hamburgers
dearly and that the Senate had helped defeat.
As news reached Hamburg of Napoleon’s return to Paris in March 1815, calls for the reinstatement of a voluntary corps from Hamburg to join the Hanseatic Legion were once again
voiced by members of various reforming parties. Dissolved on 1 September 1814 due to its
popular ties and its political unreliability, the Hanseatic Legion in Hamburg was a site of tension
387
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between reformists and city authorities.390 The Senate had reluctantly compensated each
Legionnaire 24 Marks for all losses during the campaign against the Grand Army yet refused to
acknowledge veterans who had lost homes during the siege or who had fallen into poverty and
unemployment after the Legion was dissolved. It eventually fell to private societies such as the
Hanseatic Association (Der Hanseatische Verein), the Club for Hanseatic Fighting Comrades in
1813 and 1814 (Freundsschafts-Club der Hanseatischen Kampfgenossen von 1813 und 1814),
and the Hamburg Women’s Association (Hamburger Frauenverein), to develop and organize
programs that provided veterans with medical and burial assistance as well as institutions to
support widows and orphaned children.391 Hamburg’s Patriotic Society also privately recognized
victims of French occupation by awarding honorary medals to those who aided refugees in
December 1813, and also dedicated a monument in Ottensen cemetery to the 1,138 who did not
survive in exile.392
These acts by private organizations not only pinpoint a site of early-nineteenth century
middle-class politics, they also directly contested the Senate’s increasingly noninterventionist
agenda. But the Senate would not be outdone.393 In March, it announced that on 18 and 19
March, the city would host a series of award ceremonies to be followed by parades,

390

The dissolving of the Legion in Hamburg caused a stir throughout the city, with a number of high
ranking individuals, such as Colonel von Baumbach and, one of the heroes of 1813, David Mettlerkamp, publically
denouncing the Senate’s negligence toward both the city’s well-being but also Europe’s. See Mettlerkamp,
Vorschläge, Hamburgs Männern gewindet von Mettlerkamp. Eventually, a corps of 1,000 soldiers and 200
cavalrymen (equipped at their own expense) were recalled by the Allies to fight against the now reorganized
Imperial Army in 1815. See “Publicandum,” 5 April 1815; “Publicandum,” 28 April 1815; “Bekanntmachtung,” 3
May 1815 (Anderson, vol. 20), 64-6, 80-1, 85-7. However, soldiers from the Hanseatic Legion arrived too late to
see action and served as part of an army of occupation until their return in January 1816. See, Stieve, “Troops of the
Hanseatic Republics,” 24.
391

Herbert Freudenthal, Vereine in Hamburg: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Volkskunde der Geselligkeit
(Hamburg, 1968), 96.
392

Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 311.

393

Heyden, “Öffentliche Fest in Hamburg,” 202.

129

illuminations, and free entertainment for Hamburg’s lower classes.394 The first evening, church
services were held throughout the city in honor of the sacrifices made by the men of the Citizens
Militia and Hanseatic Legion. Both the Militia and Legion were hailed as patriotic saviors of the
Vaterstadt, while simultaneously held up as models for the rest of German Central Europe to
emulate.395 The following afternoon, the Hanseatic Campaign Medal was awarded to all soldiers
who served in the campaign against the Grand Army, while medals of honor were awarded to
soldiers whose service was deemed exemplary. The Senate also offered full citizenship to all
servicemen and waived the requisite fee. The ceremony was followed by a three-hour long
parade of Senators and soldiers, which ended at Hamburg’s City Hall.396 The entire award
ceremony positioned the sacrifice of Hamburg’s warriors as their patriotic duty to defend the
welfare of the city and its governing body. The event also played on a distinct theme the Senate
had slowly begun to introduce. By the very act of creating and then awarding medals, the Senate
was publically declaring itself as the legitimate heir of the armed struggle against the French. It
is also important to note that the Senate participated in such events at a time when it was being
publically derided for the lack of attention to servicemen and when private, reformist societies
were organizing public events themselves. Through such symbolically charged spectacles, the
Senate was able to redirect challenges to its authority while defining the meaning of the Wars of
Liberation.
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By late May 1815, the recalled corps of Legionnaires from Hamburg was ready for the
long march to France. Yet before their final departure, the Senate announced that on 31 May the
Hanseatic Legion would partake in a massive “Celebration of Victory” that included church
services, a parade of Senators and soldiers, and would end with an award ceremony. Once again,
the city was shut down by orders of the Police Authority, who limited travel in and out of the city
and threatened severe punishment to anyone who attempted either to leave during the celebration
or disrupt it in any way.397 On 31 May, the events began with services and a singing of a Te
Deum in every church throughout the city. At 10 o’clock, thousands of Hamburgers lined the
city’s large parade ground, Heiligengeistfeld , to witness a revue of the Legion by the city’s
Senators and its commanding officers. The following parade of 1,500 soldiers, a platoon of
cavalry, as well as a number of artillerymen, entered the city gates at Dammtor, and after three
hours, wound its way to the City Hall on Neuerwall. Outside the City Hall, Hamburg’s
“esteemed government” and “happy constitution,” which the city “rightly deserved,” were fêted,
a moment which, according to one witness, “stirred the heart of every Hamburg citizen.”398
Here, Senators Bartels, Jencquel, Westphalen, and Hasse were all awarded the Hanseatic medal
for their leadership and participation during the years 1813 and 1814.399 As reported in
Hamburgische Nachrichten, those in attendance truly “recognized the Senate’s merits,” its “right
to rule in the name of God,” and its willingness to defend the Vaterstadt, its traditions, and its
laws.400
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After the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in mid-June 1815, Hamburg’s Senate had
secured its position as the legitimate defender of the city’s sovereignty and heir of the Wars of
Liberation. And while reform-minded individuals such as Caspar Voght and Ferdinand Beneke,
two of Hamburg’s most prominent citizens, continue to press for political and social reforms, the
Senate’s authority would go virtually unquestioned until the 1840s. Yet the city still played host
to similar state spectacles that utilized city space in the demonstration of the Senate’s authority.
Parades and church services on 2 July 1815 held in celebration of victory in France and
Hamburg’s final “deliverance,” saw the Senate once again associating itself with the
“unmistakable involvement of Providence.”401 On 3 January 1816, in honor of the signing of the
Treaty of Paris in November 1815, and the return of the Hanseatic Legion, services were offered
and a day of festivities including a parade and speeches by Senators Bartels and Hasse who once
again reiterated the role played by the Senate in the Wars of Liberation.402
The meaning of the anti-Napoleonic struggle would finally be solidified when, in October
1817, the Senate announced that 18 October (the anniversary of the battle of Leipzig and the
Senate’s second and final return) would become the official date for the celebration of the Wars
of Liberation.403 Accordingly, on 18 October 1817, Hamburg hosted one of the largest festivals
in city history that included highly publicized church services, award ceremonies, and a massive
parade that consisted of the entire Senate, Hanseatic Legion, and Citizens Militia. The day began
with uniformly regulated services throughout the city’s churches, which included a special
collection for Hamburg’s disabled population as well as surviving families of fallen soldiers.
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After the service, the Citizens Militia marched to St. Michael’s Church where the flags of 1813
were honored and a bronze memorial listing the names of the 175 Hamburgers who fell at
Leipzig was dedicated to the city on behalf of a “grateful Senate.” The memorial was decorated
with palm and oak branches, a medieval helmet, Hamburg’s ensign, and the inscription, “To the
fallen for freedom and justice. The Risen Hamburg,” all of which combined notions of freedom,
independence, and the defense of the city’s traditional institutions. It was estimated that some
10-15,000 people were on hand to witness the day’s events, all of whom were said to have
shown “their devotion to the constitution, their love for their government” and a longing for an
“ancient sense of freedom” that relied on “cordiality, morality, and desire for peace.”404
Festivities marking the anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig and the triumph of
Hamburg’s Senate were held every year. As Aaslestad has shown, the celebration and meaning
of the Wars of Liberation subtly changed over the course of the nineteenth century in response to
political and cultural trends throughout Central Europe.405 In 1817, the celebration of the Battle
of Leipzig, as well as the accompanying literature, stressed the regaining of Hamburg’s freedom
and independence and was articulated as a victory for the city’s autonomy. Twenty-five years
later, in 1838, the event still marked a unique experience for Hamburg, as the literature focused
on Hamburg’s regained independence while also criticizing Prussian expansion westward. But
by 1863, the fiftieth anniversary of Leipzig, public celebration had begun to mingle the local
experience with that of a national experience. Commemorative literature featured Hamburg as a
“prototype for self-liberation” for the rest of Germany and tied Hamburg’s 1813 ordeal into a
shared German historical experience and stressed a sense of “belonging to a larger cultural
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entity.”406 The Revolution of 1848, the Danish wars in Schleswig-Holstein, and centenary
anniversaries of German classicist Friedrich Schiller (and the Central European-wide Schiller
festivals) introduced the concept of German nationalism to a young and expanding population in
Hamburg. Yet a growing sense of nationalism did not translate into support for Prussia.
Hostility towards Bismarck and Prussian expansion continued, and concerns regarding the city’s
independence were clearly evident until 1870. Finally, by 1913, after the formation of the
Second German Empire in 1871 and Hamburg’s incorporation into the new German state,
celebrations of Leipzig subsumed Hamburg’s liberation as part of a shared common German
cultural experience and, more importantly, rendered the city’s experience as the initial realization
of a nationalist agenda. While such a close reading of the contemporary literature has
implications for the study of historical memory, it also points to the fact that the use of public
space went far beyond the realm of local politics. In response to international events and
intellectual trends, urban space could be appropriated to represent a host of political positions
while being invested with a certain didactic function.
The historiography of post-war Hamburg tends to suggest that the Senate was concerned
exclusively with saving the city’s economy to the point that politics appears as an afterthought.
And while there is a certain amount of truth there, it misses a crucial point: that the Senate was
immediately engaged in a series of power struggles, from which it emerged victorious, that had
real consequences for the future of the city. Through the Senate’s combined use of popular
media and public space, the government was able to represent itself to its populace as the
legitimate heir of the struggle against Napoleon and as the party of order and security. It did this
in a number of ways. On the one hand, as the first two chapters argue, the Senate monopolized
the use of legitimate force in the form of a professionalized Police Authority (a product of
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French occupation) which not only enforced the Senate’s agenda but also magnified the
government’s visibility through its very presence. On the other hand, the Senate deftly addressed
challenges to its legitimacy through a series of highly-choreographed and ideologically charged
spectacles that transformed city space into a stage for the representation of its authority.
Hamburg’s post-1815 Senate was then able to promote a laissez-faire social and economic
agenda that favored its mercantile elite only after it effectively established the ideological
contours of its rule.
An understanding of Hamburg’s nineteenth-century political environment also suggests a
critical modification of Jürgen Habermas’s model of the public sphere. By neglecting forms of
public representation, Habermas failed to fully integrate elements of the public sphere into the
discussion of nascent modern political cultures. Historians of post-Napoleonic Germany then
must pay greater attention to the ways in which discursive formations became externalized and
made accessible to emerging public(s). By placing greater weight on regional political cultures
and the role of public space between the crucial years 1780 and 1840, historians will be able to
reconfigure the social and political frontiers of the Vormärz and even reperiodize German
Central Europe’s transformation from the old order to modern mass society. As this chapter has
shown, representative publicness is not simply replaced by print culture and rational-critical
debate; on the contrary, public space itself was becoming increasingly politicized as the
nineteenth century progressed. To conclude, attention to early-nineteenth century “publicness”
in Hamburg is useful in that it enables the socio-political dispositions of the Restoration era to be
more precisely determined. The post-war Senate’s use of public space deepens our
understanding of the public sphere by pointing to the ways in which space became politicized as
an arena for the assertion, articulation, and representation of political authority.
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CONCLUSION

The debate regarding the extent to which Imperial occupation affected how the city of
Hamburg was governed is one that has split historians for decades. Were the years between
1806 and 1814 a watershed or do distinct continuities outweigh any noticeable changes after
1815? I argue that there was a clear shift not only in the political culture of the city but also a
change in the practices and conceptions of authority and legitimacy. Many historians, however,
have stressed continuity, arguing that Hamburg’s pre-modern elites maintained their hold over
city politics until the 1850s.407 Richard Evans, among others, has argued that this “crassly selfserving regime” is to blame not only for cholera epidemics in the 1830s and for the Great Fire of
1842 (which destroyed almost half of the city), but, more tellingly, for renewed cholera
outbreaks in the early 1890s, a time when cholera had been eradicated from western Europe by
sanitary reform.408 While there is no disputing the fact that the same lawyers and merchants still
firmly held the reins of government, the argument that Hamburg’s post-1815 political culture
was the same as that which existed before 1806 (or in 1811, after its annexation) is less credible.
The men whose political career began under occupation approached the governing of Hamburg
in new and decidedly modern ways. There was also a change in the way city functionaries
related to its population, as older notions of community and civic commitment were rejected in
favor of a socially noninterventionist and laissez-faire approach to governing.
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While deliberately sidestepping questions regarding Hamburg’s post-war identity or the
rise of German nationalism, this study concerned itself with the modernization of the city’s
social and political worlds in the years after 1814/5. A fundamental issue here is the increased
centralization of the Hamburg’s administrative bodies and the state’s total monopolization of
force in the form of a professional policing agency. Much of the city’s sprawling and
decentralized Reformation-era administration had remained up until 1806; private organizations,
the Wedde (the body most responsible for overseeing social policy), and virtually all departments
of Hamburg’s government maintained some form of policing powers. This authority was often
wielded summarily as formal legal processes simply did not exist. Yet within the first years of
French occupation after 1806, Hamburg witnessed an unprecedented transformation in the
running of city affairs. This process of change was quickened after the city’s incorporation into
the Empire and with the full introduction of the Napoleonic Code in January 1811.
Administrative bodies were streamlined and had their ties to the church severed, the guilds were
stripped of their influence, a rationalized legal code and court system was put in place, a
hierarchical and professionalized police force was established, and all vestiges of Hamburg’s
feudal past were eradicated.
Many of these French reforms were scaled back after the end of the occupation in 1814,
yet the introduction of a substantially more modern and rationalized administrative structure in
Hamburg was not without its lasting effects. Most notably, Hamburg’s post-1814 Senate chose
to maintain reforms to the city’s policing institutions. This decision to centralize the police force
(now armed and divested of any role as social caretaker) entailed two other significant changes
in the way politics was understood and practiced. On the one hand, the Senate’s monopolizing
of force under the newly minted Police Authority in 1814 and 1815, redefined concepts of
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authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty, making them contingent on the government’s ability to
establish and defend order and security. Support for Revolutionary ideals such as popular
sovereignty found support in Hamburg and calls for constitutional reform plagued the city’s
Senate both before and immediately after Imperial occupation. And while the Senate would not
face armed insurrection, as the overwhelming majority of the city’s population desired a return to
peace, their legitimacy was no longer based on recourse to tradition. New concepts of the
relationship between rulers and ruled forced the Senate, and the socio-economic order it
represented, to militarize itself in order to defend its interests. It is one of this study’s
fundamental precepts that at its very core, modern political authority and legitimacy rests on the
state’s ability to monopolize and apply (or threaten) force against internal and external threats to
its existence.
On the other hand, the reliance on a professionalized police force also redefined the way
in which the Senate related to its population. Well into to the nineteenth century, republicanism
and concern for the common weal informed city politics. In fact, virtually all members of
Hamburg’s Senate at one time or another worked in the world of poor relief. But after 1815, the
Senate began a full-scale retreat from its past social concerns and instead pressed an
economically liberal agenda that clearly suited its mercantile elite. The city’s famed Poor Relief
was drastically reduced, medical care for both adults and children was cut, laws restricting
residency for the unemployed were given teeth, and it eventually became illegal to feed or clothe
orphaned children. Rather than recognize the effect fluctuations in the market had on families,
poverty and unemployment were articulated as a personal flaw of the individual. Thanks in no
small part to the religious revivalism of the post-Napoleonic period, the influx of refugees, and
the exigencies of rebuilding a shattered economy, the Senate’s response to the growing number
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of urban poor was increased surveillance and policing. This recourse to expanded policing of
newly-created categories of deviants only reinforced the need for increased police presence as
arrests skyrocketed. This would inevitably lead to a lack of supporters or champions of
Hamburg’s working poor in the established channels of city government. The inability of the
Senate to adequately address the problem of urban poverty is certainly to blame for the horrible
cholera epidemics and is likely the reason why, by 1860, Hamburg had, according to August
Bebel, become the capital of socialism in Germany.
This study also investigates other aspects of modern political culture that are often
neglected: the politicization of urban space and importance of political performance in the
practice of legitimacy and authority. While city space had always been a stage to present
economic grievances, to establish and defend honor, or to dictate and force proper behavior on
individuals, space had yet to become an arena where distinctly political concerns could be
addressed. During the first years of the French Revolution, space was invested with political
significance as new ideas (and their respective proponents) clashed for control over public
opinion. During the Imperial occupation of Hamburg, the French administration routinely took
to the streets and market squares to represent its authority before the city’s inhabitants. In the
post-Napoleonic years, Hamburg’s Senate similarly used the built environment to establish its
ideological contours, to reinforce its commitment to the defense of traditional authority
throughout Europe, and to position itself as the legitimate heir to the Wars of Liberation. This
offers a crucial rereading of Jürgen Habermas’s concept of “representative publicness” by
arguing for its continued usefulness for historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
By 1815 Central Europe had witnessed almost twenty-five years of unprecedented
brutality, warfare, political instability, and economic upheaval. Historians of the late nineteenth
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century and of the Kaiserreich are now beginning to turn their attention to the period following
Napoleon’s final defeat and the international system established by the Congress of Vienna.
Focusing on the distinct regional political cultures that emerged after 1815 should help historians
to better understand the political contours of the Restoration as well as the Vormärz. The ways
in which popular festivities and public space were invested with political meaning and how
discursive formations were articulated and eventually received by an emerging public are crucial
themes for historians to wrestle with. The issues raised by this particular study undoubtedly
revolve around the (re)establishment of power and authority and the means by which that was
accomplished. But the process by which everyday individuals accessed (internalized and
identified with) concepts of traditional authority, citizenship, popular sovereignty, individual
rights, and socialism, in the years after 1815, has yet to be adequately researched and awaits its
historian.
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